RECORDS CODE SHEET
5ND 4535 (Rev. 5-60)

NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER

GENERAL (Card No. 1)

Field	Entry	Columns
Bureau Number	1 4 8 2 2 2	16-21
Reporting Custodian	9 1 9	22-24
Type of Duty	1 2	25-26
Major Command	—	27
Aircraft Damage	A	28
Aircraft Injury	A	29
Maneuver prior to Accident	G	30
First Accident type	S 1	31-32
First Accident phase	3 1	33-35
Second Accident type	C 3	36-37
Second Accident phase	A 2	38-40
Type of Operation	3	41-42
Contributing Cause Factors	1 M	43-47
Pilot Factor, First	O 1	48-49
Pilot Factor, Second	P 9	50-51
Pilot Factor, Third	O 5	52-53
First other Personnel Factor		54-55
Second other Personnel Factor		56-57
Primary Major Material Factor	D	58
Secondard Major Material Factor		59
Design		60
Facilities		61
Special Data & Cond.	8 A G	62-68
Type of Flight Hazard		69
Pri. Cause/Avoidable Inc. or Flt Haz or Gr Acd't	/	70
Recommendation Code		71-72
Carrier Hull Number		73-74
No Personnel Card ("R")		80

SUPPLEMENTARY (Card No. 2)

Field	Entry	Columns
Weather		16-21
Kind of Flight	1 J	22-24
Relative Wind - Direction	U	25
Relative Wind - Velocity	1	26
Relative Wind (Old Code - Not in Use)		27
Clearance	2	28
Time of Day	2	29
Number of other Aircraft		30
Altitude of Occurrence		33-35
Distance from Field (Coded on forced landings only)		38-40
Length of Runway (Coded on forced landings only)		41-42
Field Elevation (Coded on forced landings only)		43-45
Non-Navy Injury ("R")		47
Number of "A" or "L" or "M" Injury	Ø 1	48-49
Number of "B" Injury		50-51
Number of "C" Injury	Ø 1	52-53
Number of "D" Injury		54-55
Number of "E" Injury		56-57
Location	A 1 K N G V L	62-68
Facility Data	K O Ø	69-74

	Don't Count (1 YR)	Enemy Action (2-3 MO)	DAY (4-5)	TYP (6)	SEQ (7-8)
ACCIDENT DAMAGE A (9) — I.D. NO.	1	Ø 5	2 5	1	Ø 2

ACCIDENT INJURY A (10) — Model (11-15): T 2 J 1

FISCAL YEAR 1 (75) — SPECIAL ATTN: ("X")

IBM: The above Fields are to be punched in all Coded Code — Model Code (76-77): 2 7

PERSONNEL STATISTICS (Card No. 3)

File Number → (b) (6) [redacted]

Pilot Name (16 17 18 19 20 21)

Card	Rank/Rate	Br Service	Age	Yrs Experience	Status	Position	Inj to Ind	Abandon A/C	Pilot Factor Involved	Trainer Utilization	Instr. Card	Total Time All Models	All Models 3 Months	All Series This Model	All Ser Mod 3 Months	CV Landings	Instrument Hours	Nite Hours	Total Time Jet
03 (b) (6) [redacted]	4 5	C	6	A	1	C	2	1	Ø 2	2	1 6	1 Ø	3 3	Ø 9		Ø 3	1 8	8 7	
Columns	32	35	37	40	42	45	47	49	51	52-53	55	56-57	58-59	62-63	65-66	68	69-70	71-72	73-74
04 SECKINGER (22-31)	3	1	J	J	C	2	A	2 4	Ø 1	2	4 Ø	Ø 1	Ø 7	Ø 1		Ø 9	Ø 5	3 1	

Dual Pilot Name (16 17 18 19 20 21)

File Number → (b) (6) [redacted]

IBM: PERSONNEL CODED ON REVERSE SIDE ☐

CODED [signature] REVIEWED [signature] LOGGED [signature] PUNCHED [signature] VERIFIED ______ REVIEWED ______ REPUNCHED ______

CODE SHEET REVIEWED BY CLASS DESK ANALYST ______ (Initials) ______ (Date)

A & R DEPT CODE SHEET

☐ Don't Count ☐ Other Aircraft

75	76	77	78	79
1	2	7	6	2

Year 1	Month 2	3	Day 4	5	Type Occurrence 6	Sequence 7	Damage 8	Injury 9	Model Aircraft 10	11	12	13	14	15
1	Ø	5	2	5	1	Ø	2	A	A	7	3	J	1	

Bureau Number

1	4	8	2	2	2

NARRATIVE BRIEF

USING NO FLAP TO PILOT WAS UNABLE TO RAISE NOSE FOR TO
AND ATTEMPTED TO ABORT AS END OF RW WAS APPROACHED
PILOT PULLED CURTAIN EJECTING BOTH PILOTS THROUGH CANOP
DUAL PILOT WAS KILLED BECAUSE SEAT FAILED TO SEPARATE
DUE TO IMPROPER RIGGING X

Prepared by [redacted] Reviewed L Punched 7 JUL 14 1961 Verified

Note to IBM: Route code sheet to Open File upon completion of Brief Cards.

U. S. NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
NORFOLK 11, VIRGINIA

NASC/113/rop
Ser: 324
APR 30 1962

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARAGRAPH 70, OPNAV INST 3750.6D

From: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
To: Commanding Officer, Training Squadron SEVEN

Subj: VT-7 AAR ser 6-61 concerning T2J-1 BuNo 148222 accident occurring 25 May 1961, pilot (b) (6)

1. The subject report and all endorsements thereon have been reviewed. The Naval Aviation Safety Center concurs with the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by subsequent endorsers.

2. The cause of this accident has been recorded by the Center indicating the pilot as the single contributing factor.

(b) (6)

By direction

Copy to:
BUWEPS (C-13) 2 copies
CNATRA
CNABATRA
CMC (CODE AAP)
BUWEPSREP COLUMBUS
CO, NPU EL CENTRO
CO VT-4

4

C-1312:HWM/88

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PARAGRAPH 70, OPNAVINST 3750.6D

27 FEB 1962

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on TRARON SEVEN AAR ser 6-61, concerning T2J-1, BuNo 148222, accident occurring 25 May 1961, Pilot (b) (6)

From: Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring with paragraph 2. of the second endorsement.

2. Anti-suffocation devices for pressure oxygen systems have been and will continue to be investigated. To date, all proposals and developments have jeopardized the system in normal operation.

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

BY direction

Copy to:
CNATRA
CNABATRA
CO, VT-7

ORIGINAL

Code 05

24 JUL 1961

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 70, OPNAVINST 3750.6D

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on TRARON SEVEN AAR ser 6-61, concerning T2J-1, BuNo 148222, accident occurring 25 May 1961, Pilot (b) (6)

From: Chief of Naval Air Training
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Forwarded, concurring in the comments and recommendations of the Board as modified by the forwarding endorsements. Concur in the action and comments indicated in the forwarding endorsements.

(b) (6) [redacted]

By direction

Copy to:
CNC (Code AAP)
BUWEPSREP Columbus
OinC, NFU, El Centro
CNATRA
CO TRARON FOUR
CO TRARON SEVEN (4)

6

U. S. NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER
U. S. NAVAL AIR STATION
Norfolk 11, Virginia

NASC/531/gh
9 August 1961

From: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

To: Chief of Naval Air Training

Subj: TRARON SEVEN Original AAR Serial 6-61 Concerning T2J-1,

Bureau No. [illegible] accident occurring 25 May 1961,

Pilot (b) (6)

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 3750.6D

1. The subject AAR was forwarded to your command on 28 June 61 by Chief of Naval Air Basic Training.

2. Request status of your endorsement and original AAR.

3. Your attention is invited to Para 46d(2) of Reference (a).

(b) (6)

By direction

Code 05
14 August 1961

FIRST ENDORSEMENT

From: Chief of Naval Air Training
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center

Subj: VT-7 AAR Serial 6-61

Encl: (1) Copy of CNATRA's THIRD ENDORSEMENT on subject AAR of 24 July 1961

1. Subject AAR was endorsed 24 July 1961 and mailed to the Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons . NAVAVSAFCEN was inadvertently omitted from the copy to addees. A copy of CNATRA's endorsement is forwarded as enclosure (1).

(b) (6)

By direction

ORIGINAL

Code 05
29 JUN 1961

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 70 OF OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6D

SECOND ENDORSEMENT on TRARON SEVEN AAR 6-61, concerning T2J-1, BuNo 148222, occurring 25 May 1961, Pilot (b) (6)

From: Chief of Naval Air Basic Training
To: Commander, U. S. Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Chief of Naval Air Training
(2) Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons

Subj: Aircraft Accident Report; forwarding of

1. Readdressed and forwarded, concurring in the comments and recommendations of the Aircraft Accident Board as modified by paragraph 2 of the First Endorsement.

2. In regards to the AAR Board recommendation #2, the Handbook of Inspection Requirements is not designed to enumerate each item to be inspected during an intermediate or major inspection but rather to call attention to areas that require work. Details concerning required inspections should be obtained by reference to applicable sections of the Handbook of Maintenance Instructions. In areas where the HMI is not considered detailed enough to satisfy command requirements inspection procedures should be further amplified by the dissemination of Continuing Action Maintenance Instructions.

3. It is recommended that the Bureau of Naval Weapons take action on AAR Board recommendation #4.

4. The pilot in this accident violated several squadron standard operating procedures as well as one OPNAV Instruction. Squadron SOPs have little value if they are not rigidly adhered to by all personnel. This is especially true in the Training Command where student pilots are developing flying procedures which will remain with them throughout their career.

5. The Commanding Officer, TRARON SEVEN is requested to make sufficient spot checks to insure that standard operating procedures are being adhered to by personnel in TRARON SEVEN.

C. H. Duerfeldt

C. H. DUERFELDT

Copy to:
BUWEPS (C-13) (Direct)
COMNAVAVSAFCEN (Direct)
BUWEPS REP, Columbus
CMC (Code AAP)
OinC, NPU
CO, TRARON FOUR
CO, TRARON SEVEN (2)

4

ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL

23 JUN 1961

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on VT-7 AAR Ser 6-61, Concerning T2J-1, BUNO 148222
Accident occurring 25 May 1961, Pilot (b) (6)

From: Commanding Officer, Training Squadron SEVEN,
Naval Auxiliary Air Station, Kingsville, Texas
To: Commander, Naval Aviation Safety Center
Via: (1) Chief of Naval Air Basic Training
(2) Chief of Naval Air Training

Subj: VT-7 AAR Ser 6-61; forwarding of

Encl: (10) Addendum to Maintenance Officer's Statement

1. Forwarded, concurring with the recommendations of the board.

2. It is considered that the primary contributing cause of this accident is pilot factor rather than the suspected failure or malfunction of the elevator control system. There is no concrete evidence to support the latter contention. The pilot's non compliance with standard operating procedures and aviation common sense bred uncertainty, doubt and indecision during one of the most critical parts of the flight - take off. As a result, the pilot was incapable of making a quick analysis of the situation and taking the sound action necessary to handle the airplane.

3. The Maintenance Officer's statement did not comment on either the ejection seat or the gas line to the canopy actuator. Enclosure (10) to this endorsement is an addendum to the Maintenance Officer's statement and corrects this deficiency.

4. Enclosure (2) contains a resume of the pilot's flying experience. He had not had any accidents in his previous flying career.

5. The importance of using check lists and of adhering to standard operating procedures has been pointed out again to all pilots. To ignore such good practices is to invite the same kind of confusion and doubt as occurred during this accident.

6. To combat ejection seat maintenance errors the recommendations of the board will be implemented. Further, the proposals outlined in the "Weekly Summary of Aircraft Accidents" (8-14 May) will be adopted.

R. F. REGAN

9

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 70 OPNAVINST 3750.6D

ORIGINAL

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
OPNAV FORM 3750-1 (Rev. 5-58) PAGE 1

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED In accordance With Para 65 OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3750.6C

OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PART I - GENERAL

ORIGINAL

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. A/C ACCIDENT BOARD APPOINTED BY: Commanding Officer VT-7	2. DATE OF ACCIDENT: 25 May 1961 / TIME (LZT): 0848S / 3. SERIAL NUMBER: AAR 6-61
4. TO: COMMANDER NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY CENTER	5. ENCLOSURES (1) PILOT's STATEMENT
6. VIA (1) C.O. VT-7	(2) RESUME OF PILOTS FLYING EXPERIENCE
(2) CHIEF OF NAVAL AIR BASIC TRAINING	(3) WITNESS STATEMENTS
(3) CHIEF NAVAL AIR TRAINING	(4) MAINTENANCE OFFICER's STATEMENT
(4)	(5) DIAGRAMS
(5)	(6) PHOTOS
	(7) AIRCRAFT CRASH FIRE REPORT
	(8) DD-175
	(9) NOR (WITH ORIG ONLY)
7. REPORTING CUSTODIAN (if different than item 1. above): SAME	8. ACTIVITY OPERATING A/C (if different than item 7.): SAME
9. KIND OF FLIGHT: 1J1 / 10. TIME OF DAY: ☐ DAWN ☒ DAY ☐ DUSK ☐ NIGHT	11. LOCATION OF ACCIDENT: (SOUTH FIELD) NAAS KINGSVILLE, TEXAS / 12. ELEVATION ABOVE SEA LEVEL: 52
13. PLACE OF LAST TAKE OFF: NAAS KINGSVILLE	14. CLEARED: FROM NAAS KINGSVILLE TO NAS PENSACOLA FLA

15. TYPE CLEARANCE: ☐ IFR ☒ VFR ☐ DVFR ☐ LOCAL ☐ OPERATIONAL ☒ AIRWAYS ☒ DIRECT ☐ OTHER (Specify)

16. TIME IN FLIGHT	17. TYPE ACCIDENT	18. PHASE OF FLIGHT
0	S-1 RAN OFF END OF RUNWAY	3-FLAPS UP TAKE OFF

A/C

19. MODEL	20. SERIAL NO.	21. DAMAGE TO A/C	22. DOLLAR COST	23. AIRSPEED (Kts.)	24. A/C WEIGHT
T2J-1	148222	☒ A ☐ B ☐ C ☐ D ☐ E ☐ F	503,000	REACHED 110 to 115 KTS	11,600

25. LIST MODEL, SER NR, REPORTING CUSTODIAN AND DAMAGE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY OTHER A/C INVOLVED (Complete on OPNAV FORM 3750-1 for each A/C involved): NONE

1. NAME (Last, first and middle initials)	2. RANK/RATE	FILE SER. NO	DESIGNATOR	BRANCH OF SERVICE	3. AGE	4. YRS OF EXP. DNA	5. BILLET	6. POSITION	7. INJURY CODE
PILOT (at controls at time of accident) (b) (6)	CAPT	(b) (6)	(b) (6)	USNR	3[illegible]	6	PILOT	FRONT COCKPIT	C
DUAL PILOT SECKINGER, NEIL V.	LCDR	[redacted]	[redacted]	USN	3[illegible]	17	DUAL PILOT	REAR COCKPIT	A

SECTION B - PERSONNEL DATA

PERSONNEL		8. OFT - OPERATIONAL FLIGHT TRAINER AVAILABLE	8. OFT - OPERATIONAL FLIGHT TRAINER USED	9. CPT - COCKPIT PROC. TRAINER AVAILABLE	9. CPT - COCKPIT PROC. TRAINER USED	10. UNIT TO WHICH PERSONNEL ARE ATTACHED	11. TYPE INSTRUMENT CARD
PILOT	YES			X	X	VT-7	☒ STANDARD ☐ SPECIAL
	NO	X	X				
DUAL PILOT	YES			X	X	VT-7	☒ STANDARD ☐ SPECIAL
	NO	X	X				

PILOT EXPERIENCE IN HOURS

12. ITEM		PILOT	DUAL PILOT	ITEM	PILOT	DUAL PILOT
ALL MODELS		1624.9	1036.5	CV LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	6/0	113/0
ALL MODELS IN LAST 12 MONTHS		354.6	194.4	FLCP LANDINGS DAY/NIGHT	120/0	NOT RECOR IN LOG BO
ALL MODELS IN LAST 3 MONTHS		108.1	19.9	INSTRUMENT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	2.8	8.5
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL (item 19)	A/C	330.7	77.1	NIGHT HOURS LAST 3 MONTHS	18.4	5.1
	OFT / CPT	2.0	1.0			
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 12 MONTHS	A/C	319.2	63.6	TOTAL HELO. HRS. (Helo. AAR Only)	N.A.	N.A.
	OFT / CPT	2.0	1.0	TOTAL JET HOURS (Jet AAR Only)	874.0	313.8
ALL SERIES THIS MODEL LAST 3 MONTHS	A/C	97.8	15.5	LAST FLIGHT, ALL SERIES THIS MODEL: DATE	23 MAY61	23 MAY61
	OFT / CPT	0.0	0.0	DURATION	1.0	0.8

OTHER PERS

13. NAME (last, first and middle initials)	RANK/RATE	FILE/SERVICE NO	ORG. TO WHICH ATTACHED	INJURY CODE	BILLET	POSITION
1 NONE						
2						
3						
4						
5						

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 70 OPNAVINST 3750.6D

OPNAV FORM 3750-1 (Rev. 5-58) **AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT** OPNAV REPORT 3750-1

PAGE 2

C. WEATHER

1. CEILING	2. VISIBILITY	3. WIND DIRECTION & VELOCITY	4. TEMPERATURE OUTSIDE AIR	4. TEMPERATURE RUNWAY	5. DEW POINT	6. ALTIMETER SETTING
11,000 BKN	10 MI	330REL/7KTS	84	84	74	29.85

7. OTHER WEATHER CONDITIONS (winds aloft, icing levels, sea state, etc., if pertinent to accident)

ORIGINAL

D. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR	✓	FACTOR
X	PILOT		LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER	X	MATERIAL FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION
	CREW		OTHER PERSONNEL (Specify)		DESIGN
	SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL		ADMINISTRATIVE		ROLLING AND PITCHING DECK/ ROUGH SEAS
	MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL		AIRPORT OR CARRIER FACILITIES		UNDETERMINED
	SERVICING PERSONNEL		WEATHER		OTHER (Specify)

E. DEPLOYMENT

FOR ACCIDENTS ABOARD DEPLOYED CARRIER (Complete following Section on Pilot)

1. DATE DEPLOYED	2. DAY - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED	3. DAY - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS
N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
4. INSTRUMENT HRS. LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYMENT	**5. NIGHT - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED SINCE DEPLOYED**	**6. NIGHT - HOURS/LANDINGS LOGGED LAST 30 DAYS**
N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

PART II - MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA

1. A/C HISTORY

DATE OF MANUFACTURE	SERVICE TOUR	MONTHS IN THIS TOUR	TOTAL NO. OF OVERHAULS	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE LAST OVERHAUL	FLIGHT HRS. SINCE ACCEPTANCE	TYPE CHECK LAST PERFORMED	FLIGHT HOURS SINCE LAST CHECK	NO. OF DAYS SINCE LAST CHECK
9 JAN 1961	1st	4	0	0	215.4	INTERMEDIATE	60.6	37

2. ENGINE HISTORY

	ENGINE MODEL	ENGINE SERIAL NO.
1		
2		
3		
4		

3. GENERAL

a. DID FIRE OCCUR? ☐ BEFORE ACCIDENT ☑ AFTER ACCIDENT ☐ DID NOT OCCUR

b. DID EXPLOSION OCCUR IN FLIGHT? ☐ YES ☒ NO

c. CHECK IF APPLICABLE ☐ AMP FUR SERIAL

d. HAS DIR BEEN REQUESTED? ☑ YES ☐ NO

e. FAILED COMPONENTS INVOLVED: ELEVATOR BOOST ACTUATOR

4. MAINT. AND ENG. FACTORS

CHECK ITEMS PRESENT IN THIS ACCIDENT

a. ☐ A/C DESIGN
b. ☐ A/C EQUIPMENT
c. ☐ MAINTENANCE
d. ☐ UNDETERMINED
e. ☐ TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
f. ☐ OTHER (Specify) ----------
g. ☐ SURFACE FACILITIES
h. ☐ HUMAN ENGINEERING (e.g., Cockpit configurations, etc.)

5. OTHER DATA

a. ALTITUDE AT MALFUNCTION	b. AIR SPEED	c. OPERATING TEMP.	d. WEIGHT OF A/C	e. C.G. (% MAC)	f. KIND OF FUEL	g. FUEL PRESSURE
DURING TAKE-OFF ROLL	100 Kts.	N.A.	11,600	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

h. EVIDENCE OF FUEL CONTAMINATION: N.A.

i. CAUSE OF ENGINE FAILURE OR FLAME OUT: N.A.

j. FUEL CONTROL REGULATOR/CARBURETOR (List Stock and Ser. nos., give time since new or overhauled): N.A.

k. EXTERNAL STORES ABOARD A/C: NONE

(If additional space is necessary, attach additional sheets)

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 70 OPNAVINST 3750.6D

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

PART II — MAINTENANCE, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES DATA (Cont'd)

ORIGINAL

SECTION B—FACILITIES DATA

1. GENERAL — √ BASIC FACILITIES INVOLVED. DESCRIBE EFFECT ON ACCIDENT IN THE ANALYSIS SECTION OF THE REPORT

✓	a. CLEARANCE AUTHORITY		i. WATER LANDING AREA	X	q. CRASH AND RESCUE
	b. FLIGHT PLANNING INFORMATION SOURCE		j. APPROACH ZONE		r. SEARCH AND RESCUE
	c. LANDING AIDS (GCA, ICA, ILS, etc.)	X	k. END ZONE (Over run)		s. CATAPULT
	d. TRAFFIC CONTROL TOWER (Field or Ship)		l. SHOULDERS		t. ARRESTING GEAR (Carrier)
	e. APPROACH AND ENROUTE AIDS TO NAVIGATION		m. TAXIWAY		u. BARRIER OR BARRICADE (Field or Ship)
	f. RUNWAY WATCH		n. PARKING AREA		v. FLIGHT DECK
	g. LANDING SIGNAL OFFICER	X	o. EMERGENCY ARRESTING GEAR (Runway)		w. MIRROR
	h. RUNWAY		p. A/C SERVICING, HANDLING AND DIRECTING (Field or Ship)		x. OTHER (Specify)

2. SHIPS DATA

a. EQUIPMENT INVOLVED: ☐ CATAPULT ☐ ARRESTING GEAR	b. PRESSURE SETTINGS	c. WIND OVER DECK	d. RELATIVE HEADWIND	e. APPROACH SPEED (SPN - 12 READING)
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

f. MARK NUMBER	g. MODEL NUMBER	h. LOCATION ON SHIP	i. LAUNCHING BRIDLE AND CONFIGURATION USED
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

j. CATAPULT / ARRESTING GEAR BULLETINS OR NOMOGRAMS USED

N/A

K. THIS PORTION SHALL BE COMPLETED WHENEVER (1) A MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVOLVES ARRESTING GEAR, BARRIER AND/OR BARRICADE EQUIPMENT, OR (2) AN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVOLVES MALFUNCTIONING OF ARRESTING GEAR, BARRIER AND/OR BARRICADE EQUIPMENT. MINOR ACCIDENTS OR ROUTINE DAMAGE TO CABLES, WELDINGS AND OTHER EXPENDABLE COMPONENTS NEED NOT BE REPORTED.

ENGAGED	DECK RUNOUT (FT.)	RAM TRAVEL (IN.)	CONTROL VALVE SETTINGS: CONSTANT PRESSURE DOME (P.S.I.)	CONSTANT PRESSURE RATIO	CONSTANT RUN-OUT (WT. LBS.)	ACCUMULATOR PRESSURE (PSI)	COMMENTS (for cable failure specify number of landings and months in service)
DECK PENDANT	N/A						
DECK PENDANT							
BARRIER							
BARRIER							
BARRICADE							

PART	SECTION	ITEM	PART III REMARKS (Continue on additional sheets)

COPY DISTRIBUTION

2CC NAVAVNSAFECEN DIRECT
1CC BUMEPS DIRECT
1CC CHATRA & MOR DIR
1CC CHABATRA & MOR DI
1CC DUMEPS REP COLUM DIRECT
1CC TRARON FOUR DIREC
1CC CNO (CODE LAP)
1CC ODIC NAVAL PARACHUTE UNIT

COST DAMAGE TO: GOVERNMENT PROPERTY $ NONE | PRIVATE PROPERTY NONE

DATE SUBMITTED TO C.O. 6/14/61

PART IV - SIGNATURES

(b) (6) SAFETY OFFICER, USN — UNIT BILLET

(b) (6) ORGANIZATION OFFICER — UNIT BILLET

(b) (6) [redacted] NC, USN

(b) (6) [redacted] — UNIT BILLET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 20, OPNAVINST 3760.6D

ORIGINAL

PART V THE ACCIDENT

On 25 May 1961, CAPT (b) (6) signed out for T2J-1, bureau number 148222 with LCDR SECKINGER as dual pilot for a ferry flight from NAAS KINGSVILLE, TEXAS to NAS PENSACOLA, FLORIDA.

The aircraft was pre-flighted by both pilots and no discrepancies were noted. The pilots strapped in with CAPT (b) (6) in the front cockpit and LCDR SECKINGER in the rear cockpit.

CAPT (b) (6) went over the pre-start check-off list and started the aircraft. The start was normal and CAPT (b) (6) went over his pre-taxi check-off list. He noted that the speed brakes did not extend when he pressed the switch to extend the speed brakes. The speed brakes indicator would show barber pole as he pressed the switch and then would immediately show in when he let go of the switch. A communications check on the intercommunications system was made and it worked normal. The oxygen masks were not fully put on by either pilot.

CAPT (b) (6) then taxied out to the duty runway completing his pre-take-off check-off list while taxiing except for the canopy and his shoulder harness.

CAPT (b) (6) requested and received clearance for take-off. As he taxiied into position for take-off, he closed the canopy and locked his shoulder harness and put the flaps up for a flaps up take-off.

CAPT (b) (6) applied full throttle control while holding his brakes and as soon as the engine tachometer indicated 100% RPM, CAPT (b) (6) released the brakes and started the take-off roll.

CAPT (b) (6) noted the oil pressure was low (estimate 70 LBS pressure) and tried to tell LCDR SECKINGER in the rear cockpit about it. He held his oxygen mask over his face with his left hand as he pushed the intercom switch to "CALL" but was unable to get a response from LCDR SECKINGER. The other instruments indicated the engine was operating normally.

LCDR SECKINGER spoke on the intercom shortly after this, but CAPT (b) (6) did not understand what was said.

The take-off roll continued until 100 kts was reached and CAPT (b) (6) tried to raise the nose to take-off attitude. The nose would not come up even though an airspeed of 110 to 115 kts had been attained. CAPT (b) (6) tried a second time to raise the nose to take-off attitude, but to no avail.

When the nose did not come up on this second attempt, CAPT (b) (6) decided to abort the take-off. He reduced power to idle, turned off some switches and reached for the hook, but he saw he was past the runway arresting gear. He pulled the stick full back and applied full brake and saw he couldn't stop the aircraft before going off the end of the runway.

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Inasmuch as there was no runway over-run, CAPT (b) (6) pulled the ejection curtain at the end of the runway. The ejection control was in the front cockpit and both pilots were ejected through the canopy.

CAPT (b) (6) section of the ejection system worked as it was designed to do, with the exception of the canopy. The distance from point of initiation to touchdown was 624 feet. LCDR SECKINGER went 599 feet from the end of the runway in the seat. Seat separation did not occur due to the fact that the striker [redacted] pivot clevis pin in the aneroid linkage was missing.

The aircraft rolled off the end of the runway into a deep gully and came to rest 491 feet from the end of the runway. The aircraft caught fire immediately. The crash crew arrived on the scene shortly thereafter and took charge.

PART VI DAMAGE TO THE AIRCRAFT

The aircraft was completely destroyed by the fire after it went into the gully.

It is estimated that the aircraft was moving at about 70 kts or more as it approached the embankment of the gully. The right main landing gear was collapsed on a concrete drainage block at the edge of the embankment.

The aircraft went over the embankment and the right wing and nose hit the other side of the gully, which ran at about a 20° angle to the aircraft's path over the ground. The aircraft slid for approximately 80 feet as it caught fire and burned.

The extensive damage to the aircraft was due to its inaccessibility to fire fighting equipment. (see enclosure 6A and 6C.).

PART VII THE INVESTIGATION

During the investigation, the following facts were established:

1. Pre-Flights

a. A proper pre-flight of the aircraft was conducted by both pilots and no discrepancies were noted.

b. The pre-taxi check-off list was peformed while taxiing out, which is contrary to squadron S.O.P. It was noted by CAPT (b) (6) that the speed brakes would not extend. The speed brake indicator showed "barber pole" when the speed brake switch was pushed to [redacted] and when the switch was released, the speed brake indicator would immediately indicate IN. The hydraulic pressure indicator showed 3000 lbs pressure.

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c. The intercommunications system was checked by the pilots and worked normally.

d. The pre-take-off check-off list was performed while taxiing out to the duty runway. This practice is also contrary to squadron S.O.P.

e. The aircraft was taxiied into position for take-off, while the canopy was being closed and while CAPT (b) (6) locked his shoulder harness. Both of these items are on the pre-take-off check list and should have been completed prior to taking the runway.

f. The oxygen masks were not put on and the intercom switches were on cold mike. (Contrary to OPNAV Instruction & Squadron S.O.P.)

g. CAPT (b) (6) raised the flaps for a flaps up take-off. Contrary to Squadron S.O.P.

2. Take-Off Roll

a. Power was applied to 100% RPM and as soon as it was reached, the take-off roll was started. Squadron S.O.P. requires a complete check of engine instruments prior to releasing the brakes for take-off roll. The engine instruments were not checked prior to starting the take-off roll. CAPT (b) (6) noted the oil pressure was low, however all other instruments were normal on the roll.

b. CAPT (b) (6) tried to contact LCDR SECKINGER on the intercom to tell him about the low oil pressure, but was unable to contact him.

c. At 100 kts, CAPT (b) (6) tried to raise the nose of the aircraft to take-off attitude. The nose did not come up and even though an estimated speed of 110 to 115 kts had been attained.

d. CAPT (b) (6) decided to abort; cut power to idle, turned some switches off, applied brakes and reached for the hook handle. The aircraft had already passed the runway arresting gear when the pilot reached for the hook handle. The arresting gear is 1500 feet from the upwind end of a 6,000 foot long runway.

e. CAPT (b) (6) couldn't stop so he pulled the stick all the way back for more braking action and reached for the gear handle thinking he could stop the aircraft with the gear up in the overrun. On the last 800 feet of the runway there were light traces of rubber from the main gear tires.

f. CAPT (b) (6) then realized there was no overrun and initiated ejection at the end of the runway. Ejection control was in the front cockpit, therefore, CAPT (b) (6) had ejection control for both pilots.

g. CAPT (b) (6) went through the air head first after seat separation and did not feel the shock of the parachute opening.

h. CAPT (b) (6) hit a boundary fence and small branches before he landed on the ground 624 feet from the end of the runway.

i. LCDR SECKINGER did not separate from his seat and he came to rest in the seat 599 feet from the end of the runway.

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3. Ejection system.

a. Rear seat S/N H-407

(1) Neither face curtain initiator (T-30E1) fired.

(2) Neither face curtain cable cutter fired.

(3) Harness release gun was not fired.

(4) Neither the seat bottom bladder nor its initiator (T31E1) inflated or fired.

(5) Neither back bladder nor its initiator T-31E1) inflated or fired.

(6) The "D" ring handle was pulled and the 2 (T-30E1) initiators were fired.

(7) The seat drogue gun was fired.

(8) The aneroid unit - Arming pin was not pulled.

(9) Evidence strongly supports the fact that no pivot pin was in the striker bellcrank at the time of ejection. (See enclosures 6H and 6I) Striker bellcrank engagement with the striker pin on the seat bulkhead produced sufficient rotation to pull firing pin from drogue gun, but the stroke was not sufficient to pull the aneroid arming pin.

b. Front seat - S/N H-406

(1) Both face curtain initiators (T 30E1) were fired.

(2) Both face curtain cable cutters fired and the wire lines on the face curtain were properly cut.

(3) The "D" ring handle was actuated and both (T-30E1) initiators were fired.

(4) The drogue gun was fired.

(5) The aneroid unit fuctioned properly.

(6) The harness release gun fired rotating the harness release bellcranks the required distance to release the two lap belt release pins and the shoulder harness pin.

(7) Both back and seat bottom bladders and their respective (T-31E1) initiators actuated properly.

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(C) This total seat system functioned as required.

c. Canopy

(1) The gas line to canopy actuator shows no evidence of having been attached (see enclosure 6J)

(2) There were no signs around the gas inlet port of the canopy actuator that ballistic gas had reached this point.

(3) The canopy actuator screw jack was nine threads up from the fully closed position.

(4) Ejection was through the canopy.

d. General

(1) The trajectory to be realized for a speed range between 90 to 110 kts would be as follows:

(a) Pilot - 500 to 550 feet to point of touchdown.

(b) Seat - Approximately 400 - 450 feet.

(2) Review of trajectory and distance measured in relation to CAPT (b) (6) shows the trajectory to be as designed.

(3) Due to separation not occurring on the rear seat, the trajectory would be longer due to the seat-man combination weight, which would result in a slower decceleration and therefore longer horizontal distance travel.

4. Elevator Control System:

a. The elevator control cables from the boost actuator in the tail to the shaave aft of the elevator control linkage were intact.

b. The elevator control linkage from this station forward was destroyed by the intense fire.

c. The elevator boost actuator is being sent to O & R, Pensacola, Florida to determine if it malfunctioned.

d. The elevator trim actuator on the port side was recovered and was found in the neutral position which is correct for take-off.

e. The starboard trim actuator was not recovered.

f. There was boost hydraulic pressure available to the system as shown by the indicator.

5. Engine and involved component parts.

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a. All the engine bearings had oil in them and showed no sign of undue wear.

b. The oil pump was in the gear train and no shafts were sheared so it is assumed the oil pump was working correctly.

c. The engine was seized due to impact damage to the gear train and the compressor shroud.

d. The oil pressure guage indicated low oil pressure probably because of instrument malfunction and not actual low oil pressure.

6. Speed brakes.

a. The speed brakes were IN and locked when recovered from the wreckage.

b. Due to the extensive fire damage the cause for the speed brakes not extending could not be determined.

7. Take-off computations and tests conducted.

a. The pilot's handbook does not contain take-off charts for flaps up, therefore, the take-off distance and lift off speed were obtained from the Field Engineering Trainer Group, North American Aviation Inc., Columbus, Ohio.

(1) The given conditions were the same as at the time of the accident:

(a) Runway temperature 84°.

(b) Seven knot head wind.

(c) Gross weight 11,600 lbs.

(d) 52 feet above sea level

(e) Flaps up.

(2) The lift off speed was determined as 110-125 kts and the take-off distance as 3000 feet maximum.

(3) The lift off speed and take-off distance for the above conditions, but with flaps down is 98 kts and 2300 feet. Taken from charts in Pilots Handbook.

b. A take-off test was conducted.

(1) The following given conditions were used:

(a) Runway temperature 84.6°

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(b) 10 - 15 kts headwind

(c) Gross weight 11,600 lbs.

(d) 60 lbs of baggage in nose of aircraft. (CAPT [redacted] aircraft had 58 lbs of baggage).

(e) 52 feet above sea level

(f) Flaps up.

(g) Stick was brought back at 100kts.

(2) The results.

(a) Nose of the aircraft came up at 100 kts.

(b) Aircraft came off the deck at 115 kts.

(c) The take-off roll distance was 2600 feet.

(d) No unusual stick feel was encountered.

8. Stopping distances (From Pilot's Handbook)

a. From 98 kts - 1720 feet.

b. From 115 kts - 2320 feet. (Curves were extended beyond graphed part of chart and interpolated).

PART VIII THE ANALYSIS

1. THE TAKE-OFF - In view of the flaps up take-off test conducted and the flaps up take-off information received from the Field Engineering Training Group, NAA, Columbus, Ohio, this aircraft should have become airborne when the stick was brought back to the take-off attitude.

The board was unable to determine the cause for the failure of the aircraft to assume a take-off attitude beyond the possibility of a failure or malfunction in the elevator control system. The elevator hydraulic boost actuator is being sent to O & R, Pensacola for DIR. The hydraulic lines on this actuator cannot be hooked up backwards due to non-compatible fittings.

The control linkage in the cockpit areas was completely destroyed by the fire. The cause for the failure or malfunction of the elevator control system is therefore undetermined.

2. Procedures used.

a. The pre-taxi check-off was performed while taxiing out, which was in violation of the squadron's operating procedures.

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b. The speed brakes not extending is reason enough for the pilot to down the aircraft for the following reasons:

(1) The pilot did not know the reason the speed brakes would not extend.

(2) The speed brakes not extending could be a possible indication of a failure in the hydraulic system.

c. The pilot started his roll for take-off without checking all of his engine instruments. The pilot should not have started a take-off roll with the oil pressure guage indicating low oil pressure (70 lbs). Minimum pressure for 100% is 114 lbs. Starting the take-off roll prior to checking all the engine instruments is in violation of the squadron's operating procedures.

d. The decision of the pilot to make a flaps up take-off on a 6000 foot runway was very unwise and in violation of the squadron's operating procedures. The position at which TAKE-OFF was initiated was approximately 500 feet from the take-off end of the runway, therefore, the runway available for use was 5,500 feet.

(1) The take-off distance for flaps up, under the conditions this attempt was made was a maximum of 3000 feet. The minimum stopping distance from 115 kts is 2320 feet. This requires 5320 feet of runway for take-off and abort without hesitation or indecision on the part of the pilot.

(2) The take-off distance for flaps down under the conditions this attempt was made require a roll distance of 2300 feet and a lift off speed of 98 kts. The minimum stopping distance from 98 kts is 1720 feet. This requires 4020 feet for take-off and abort. This would leave 1480 feet of spare runway and if the abort had been done without hesitation, the aircraft could have come to a stop in the arresting gear, which is 1500 feet from the end of the runway. It is felt therefore that had a flaps down take-off been attempted, this accident could have been averted.

e. Neither pilot had his oxygen mask on which is in violation of Training Squadron SEVEN Instruction 10127.1B which is quoted in part "All personnel will wear the following items of flight clothing while flying in the T2J-1 aircraft: f. Oxygen mask from take-off to landing".

The pilots not having their masks on and being on cold mikes definitely added to the confusion during the take-off, when CAPT (b) (6) was unable to get LCDR SECKINGER'S attention by clicking the intercom switch to "CALL" position.

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All the above listed violations definitely added to the confusion of the take-off and possibly hindered the pilot from making the correct decision at the right time when the difficulty of not being able to raise the nose was encountered.

3. The ejection system.

a. The ejection was through the canopy due to the fact that the gas line to the canopy actuator was not attached. This item is on the maintenance major check sheet and was signed off as having been CHECKED on this aircraft during the last check.

b. The rear seat not separating from the pilot was due to the fact that the pivot pin in the striker bellcrank was missing at the time of ejection. There is evidence of wear in the striker bellcrank pivot pin hole indicating that the pivot pin had been installed at one time. Since there were no work orders issued requiring removal of this pivot pin, it is believed by the board, that this pin was not properly secured by a cotter pin at the time of installation or it was removed and reinstalled insecurely or not reinstalled at all without a work order being issued. All other seats of this squadron were inspected for missing pivot pins and all pivot pins were found in and properly secured. The maintenance inspection check sheet lists the aneroid area as a check item, but does not spell out the items in this area, one of which is the anchor pin for the striker bellcrank.

c. Front seat. Everything in this seat system functioned as designed. It could not be determined as to how the "D" ring was pulled, but the initiators were fired. The pilot states he only pulled the curtain.

d. Oxygen masks.

a. Neither pilot had his oxygen mask on completely. They were hanging by one Hardiman fitting from the helmet.

b. The bailout bottle lasts from 2 to 3 minutes after ejection. CAPT (b)(6) was knocked unconscious when he hit the fence and by the time assistance arrived, it is believed he would have suffocated, had he had his mask on correctly. Since ground level ejections can end in rough terrain and the pilot can be injured there is a need for automatic release of the mask or some automatic device to let outside air into the system when the bailout bottle is empty after ejection.

PART IX COMMENTS

1. The primary contributing cause factor in this accident is the fact that the aircraft did not become airborne due to a suspected failure or malfunction of the elevator control system.

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2. The contributing pilot cause factor in this accident is that a flaps up take-off was attempted, which required almost the full length of the runway for take-off roll and abort stopping distance. This same take-off attempt with flaps down left 1500 feet of runway remaining after take-off roll and abort stopping distance.

3. This take-off should never have been attemped for the following reasons:

   a. Both pilots were Assistant Maintenance Officers and should have realized the significance of taking an aircraft that had discrepancies.

   b. The low oil pressure would have been noted prior to commencing take-off roll had the correct procedure of checking engine instruments been used.

   c. The speed brakes would not extend.

4. The procedure of going over check-off lists while taxiing on any type of flight is in violation of standard operating procedures of this squadron.

PART X RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that closer attention by supervisory authority be exercised both in adherance to Standard Operating procedures and in review of maintenance procedures. A continubus review of procedures by all personnel, flight and maintenance, must be examined periodically in an effort to remain cognizant of changes required or occurrences of non-compliance with standard operating procedures and/or check sheets.

2. It is recommended that both the intermediate and major check sheets on the maintenance of the ejection seats be revised so that the check sheet shows each item to be checked, especially the striker arm pivot pin, which is not listed on the check sheet. It is further recommended that no work be accomplished on the ejection system without a work order being issued.

3. It is recommended that only qualified personnel be permitted to sign off gripes on/or inspection of the ejection seat system. If the number of qualified personnel assigned do not meet the requirements of the command, then a strenousconsciontious effort must be exerted to train enough other personnel to meet the needs. Special attention must be given to selecting only the most highly qualified personnel to be used as instructors.

4. It is believed that had CAPT (b) (6) been wearing his oxygen mask at the time of his low level ejection, he would have died from suffication. This belie is based on the figures of usable time/quantity of the bailout bottle, which is activated at ejection. The emergency oxygen supply is capable of providing approximately 2 to 3 minutes of normal breathing at sea level. From the time of initiation of ejection until help arrived for CAPT (b) (6), 5 to 6 minutes has elapsed and CAPT (b) (6) was unconscious from the time he contacted the ground.

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In view of the above it is recommended that the Bureau of Weapons immediately initiate a study of the problem, which is to insure that outside air be made available to the pilot as soon as the emergency oxygen supply has been depleted.

ORIGINAL

STATEMENT of CAPT (b) (6) USMC - PILOT

I signed out for T2J-1, BUNO 148222 about 0730S on 25 May 1961 with LCDR SECKINGER as dual pilot. We both did a complete pre-flight on the aircraft and there were no discrepancies noted. I went over the pre-start check-off list and started the aircraft. The start was normal.

I performed the pre-taxi check-off list while taxiing out and noted my speed brakes would not extend. Mr. SECKINGER and I made an intercom check and it was working normal.

The pre-take-off check list was completed and I put my flaps up for a flaps up take-off. I taxied out for take-off as I closed the canopy and locked my shoulder harness. When I got to 100%, I started rolling immediately.

Mr. SECKINGER and I were on cold mike and did not have our masks on. I noted as I was rolling the oil pressure was low. I noticed light vaporization in the presurization intake and an unusual smell in the cockpit. The cockpit temperature was set on one. I kept clicking the mike trying to get Mr. SECKINGER's attention and he just looked at me in the mirror, not realizing I was trying to get him. The intercom had checked out okay in the line. Right after this, I heard him on the mike, but I did not understand what he said. At 100 kts, I tried to raise the nose to a take-off attitude, but it wouldn't come up. I reached an airspeed of about 110 to 115 knots and the nose still wouldn't come up. I could move the stick back, but it felt unusual. The nose did not assume take-off attitude. I didn't want to take-off, if it was going to be that hard to get off the ground, so I aborted. I took power off to idle and cut some of the switches and put my feet on the brakes, but I did not slow up. Then I reached for the hook and saw that I was past the barrier. Then I pulled back on the stick to get more braking action and I started to lift the gear handle. I thought if I could get the gear up, I could stop it, but there was no over run, so I decided to eject. I ejected right on the end of the runway. I estimate I was going about 60 knots. I had ejection control in the front cockpit. I ejected with the curtain and I believe LCDR SECKINGER went way ahead of me. The next thing I knew, I was going head first above the ground. I did not feel the parachute open. I remember looking back and seeing the risers as I landed on the fence and trees.

This accident could have been prevented if I had aborted the take-off earlier.

(b) (6)

CAPT USMC

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 7D OPNAVINST 3750.6D

ENCLOSURE 1A

ORIGINAL

25 May 1961

Statement of CAPT. (b) (6) directly following crash as heard by LT. (b) (6)

CAPT (b) (6) stated we taxied out to the runway, I was in the front cockpit. We pulled out on the runway, my speedbrakes were in and my flaps were up. I applied power for take-off and I noticed the oil preasure was low. I started to roll.

LCDR (b) (6) then interrupted with the question. "You took off with your flaps up?".

CAPT (b) (6) answered, "Yes, I wanted to do it the way, I was going to make a left turn out."

CAPT (b) (6) continued his statement. We were going down the runway, plane wasn't going to fly, speed brakes wouldn't work, brakes wouldn't work worth a damn, can't stop, I ejected.

This statement was heard approximately ten minutes after the crash, at the location where CAPT (b) (6) came down. CAPT (b) (6) regained consciousness at that time; he had not received any sedation, and considering his condition spoke very legibly and distinctly. He did not seem to be in great pain and was completely aware of what had happened.

(b) (6)

ENCLOSURE 1B

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 7C OPNAVINST 5750.6D

ORIGINAL

RESUME OF CAPT (b) (6) FLYING EXPERIENCE

COMMAND	TIME AND TYPE FLYING	TYPE A/C	HOURS FLOWN
VMF-115	AUG 5[illegible]-FEB 57 VF	FL4D-1	50
		RL4D-6	4
		AD-5	3
		T-28B	5
		SNB-5	2
		TV-2	27
MARAVNRCPLBN AIRFMFPAC	MAR 57-APR 57 PROFICIENCY	TV-2	2
H & S FMF CAMP LEJUNE	MAY 57-FEB 59 PROFICIENCY	SNB	144
		TV-2	70
		F9F-8	41
H & S 8TH MAR 2ND MAR DIV	FEB 59-JUNE 59 PROFICIENCY	SNB-5	23
		F28B	4
VT-7	JULY 59-MAY 61 FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR	T2V-1	144
		T-28B	221
		SNB-5	34
		T2J-1	331

(b) (6)

LCDR USN
SAFETY OFFICER

ENCLOSURE 2A

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 7O OPNAVINST 3750.6D

ORIGINAL

RESUME OF LCDR SECKINGER'S FLYING EXPERIENCE

COMMAND	TIME AND TYPE FLYING	TYPE A/C	HOURS FLOWN
VT-94	OCT 44-NOV 45 VT	TBM	442
CASU-22	DEC 45-MAR 46 PROFICIENCY	TBM SNB	22 10
VRF-3	MAR 46-MAY 46 VR FERRY	TBM R4D	18 36
VR-6	MAY 46-JUNE 47 VR	R5D SNJ	770 25
VF-98 (RESERVE SQUAD) INACTIVE DUTY	JUNE 47-JUNE 48 PROFICIENCY	F4U AD TBM	42 90 45
FASRON-1	JUNE 48-NOV 49 PROFICIENCY	F6F SNB	32 113
INACTIVE DUTY	NOV 49-JAN 51	NO FLYING	
NAS COLUMBUS	JAN 51-MAR 54 VR AND PROFICIENCY	SNJ SNB F6F F4U F2H TV-2 R4D R5D	38 318 115 31 68 37 173 138
NAS SEATTLE	MAR 54-OCT 55 VR AND PROFICIENCY	SNB R5D	42 334
CIC NAS GLENVIEW	NOV 55-FEB 56 TRAINING	SNB	37
TACRON 23	FEB 56-JULY 56 VR AND PROFICIENCY	SNB	75
FLIGHT TRG CEN NORFOLK	JULY 56-APR 58 PROFICIENCY	SNB	173
VF(AW) 4	APR 58-AUG 59 VF	TV-2 F2H SNB	30 113 40
VT-7	SEPT 59-MAY 61 TEST AND PROFICIENCY	SNB T2V	158 46

(b) (6)

LCDR USN
SAFETY OFFICER

ENCLOSURE 2B

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 7G OPNAVINST 3750.6D

ORIGINAL

STATEMENT OF ENS [redacted] (b) (6) USNR - STUDENT PILOT

At the time of the accident, I was in the control tower. I had a very clear view of the accident. The aircraft was cleared for take off on runway 17. It was the first plane to be cleared on runway 17, since the duty runway had been 13 just prior to the accident.

The winds were from 130-150/8, the alt. 29.86. The aircraft started it's normal take-off roll. As I watched the plane gain speed down the runway, I noticed that it was unusually fast for not being airborne.

As the plane passed the arresting gear, I knew something was definetly wrong and since the plane had not even assumed the take-off attitude. I then saw the nose oleo compress as the brakes were applied, but much too late to stop the plane.

The two pilots ejected just prior to leaving the runway. The seats did not appear to go higher than 50-75 feet. The plane left the runway and exploded. One of the parachutes streamed, but did not open. The other did not appear to even stream.

I am a flight student in Basic Training. I am in Formation stage of Training.

[redacted] (b) (6)

ENS USNR

THIS IS CONSIDERED TO BE A CREDITABLE STATEMENT

ENCLOSURE 3A

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 7C OPNAVINST 3750.6D

ORIGINAL

STATEMENT OF [redacted] ACC - CHIEF TOWER OPERATOR

At 1448Z - VJ48222, GREY OAK 177 T2J was cleared for take-off on runway 17 South Field. His take off roll seemed normal, with sufficient airspeed to get airborne, after he passed the arresting gear, it looked as though he was trying to abort his take off. I realized he could not possibly stop in time and that he would drop off the end of the runway, so I yelled for [redacted] AC1 to ring the crash phone. The A/C went off the end of the runway and burst into flames. I saw one parachute open partially and did not see the other one.

Kingsville 10MB5 was on the hardstand and was on the scene with Kings 17 ambulance at 1449, about one minute later. Kingsville 12MB5 at the base of South Tower was on the scene at 14512. The Helicopter was on the scene at 1452Z.

The weather at the time was 1400 broken 9000 broken higher broken, vis 10, temperature 84, Dew pt. 74, Wind SSW 7, ALT 29.85, Relative Humidity 73%.

My experience as a tower operator is as follows:

1. 9 yrs. tower
2. 3 yrs. GCA, and have attended Class A, B, and C AC Schools.

[redacted]
ACC USN

THIS IS CONSIDERED TO BE A CREDITABLE STATEMENT

ENCLOSURE 3B

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 7C OPNAVINST 5750.6D

ORIGINAL

STATEMENT OF (b) (6) AC1 - TOWER OPERATOR

VJ48222 T2J was taking off on runway 17, and was passing the gear. The aircraft appeared to make an attempt to abort. As the aircraft passed the intersection of taxiway E, the crash phone was activated. Both ejection seats left the aircraft as it passed the roll off end of the runway. The seats appeared to go up about 500 feet. The aircraft went off the roll end of the runway and burst into flame as it went down into the gully. As I looked up from the crash phone, I saw 2 MB5s, an ambulance and crash pickup proceeding down runway 17 to the scene.

Weather at the time of the crash was 1400 broken 9000 broken higher broken, visibility 10, temperature 84, dew point 74, SSW 7, altimeter 29.85, Relative Humidity 73%.

I have the following experience in air traffic control:

1. 7 years, 9 mo. total experience.
2. 1 year, 6 mo, radar controller.
3. 6 years, 3 mo. tower controller.

(b) (6)

AC1 USN

THIS IS CONSIDERED TO BE A CREDITABLE STATEMENT

ENCLOSURE 3C

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 7C OPNAVINST 3750.6D

ORIGINAL

MAINTENANCE OFFICER'S STATEMENT CONCERNING T2J-1, BUNO 148222 PILOT (b) (6) [redacted]

T2J-1 BuNo 148222 was accepted new by VT-7 on 13 January 1961. A special inspection in accordance with CNATRA Instruction 3110.2 dated 10 October 1958 was performed. Since this inspection the aircraft has undergone the following periodic inspections.

Intermediate - 12 Feb 1961

1st Major - 15 Mar 1961

Intermediate - 18 Apr 1961

It was discovered on 14 May 1961 that this aircraft had a cracked fuselage frame upon commencement of the 2nd Major inspection. This inspection was terminated and the aircraft was prepared for a one-time flyaway to O&R at NAS Pensacola. It had 4.4 hours remaining to complete the ferry flight with 60.6 hours flown since last inspection.

T2J-1 BuNo 148222 accumulated 245.4 hours between ~~13 January 1961~~ acceptance and 25 May 1961. The history of this aircraft shows no discrepancies related to the accident. It had no record of elevator control malfunction.

T2J BuNo 148222 was transferred from A-3 to H-6 status on 15 May 1961 awaiting transfer to Pensacola. The aircraft had a routine daily and pre-flight inspection on 25 May 1961 prior to departing on the flight.

The following components were removed and emergency DIR is being conducted by NAS Pensacola O&R.

1. Fuel Control
2. Fuel Pump
3. Elevator Boost Package

Results of the DIR, if appropriate, will be forwarded as an addendum to this report.

The aircraft engine was disassembled and inspected by VT-7 under supervision of the PRATT & WHITNEY Factory representative. No indications of engine malfunction were noted.

(b) (6) [redacted]

LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (4)

VT-7 AAR Ser 6-61, Concerning [redacted] Accident Occurring 5-25-61 Pilot (b) (6)

ORIGINAL

ADDENDUM TO MAINTENANCE OFFICER'S STATEMENT 2 JUN 1961

A complete review of all work orders and yellow sheets reveal no discrepancies which would require the seats of T2J-1 BUNO 148222 to be pulled with the exception of the first major inspection completed on 15 March 1961. In addition there were no work orders or yellow sheet squawks which would require disconnection of the high pressure gas line to the canopy. This item is also spelled out as a check to be accomplished on major inspections. From the above, the following can be concluded:

1. The only time the seat was removed from the aircraft or worked on was during the first major inspection.

2. The high pressure gas lines to the canopy jettisoning device were signed off as being secure, reference item 1 of the Safety and Survival section of HIR.

As for specific inspection requirements of the seat the following is true:

1. Item 4m of the Safety and Survival section of the HIR calls for inspection of the aneroid mounting, arming pin, and thruster rod for security. This does not spell out an inspection of the bell crank or bell crank pivot pin. However, with the seat removed it is felt that any outward irregularity in this area would have been noted. Records indicate that the following men worked on the entire Safety and Survival section of the first major inspection of this aircraft in the following capacity:

(b) (6)	AA	Performed Work
(b) (6)	AME3	Systems Inspector

Records available in the Enlisted Personnel Office indicate (b) (6) was assigned to the Airframes Division of the Maintenance Department. Records are very limited as to (b) (6) qualifications. These qualifications can only be obtained from personnel previously detached. However, (b) (6) recalls (b) (6) on-the-job training and states he was well trained and was well qualified.

(b) (6) attended and graduated from AME(A) School. On 19 April 1961 was given an examination for Oxygen System Inspector in T2J-1 aircraft. A grade of 3.64 was attained. His nomination was signed by (b) (6) and approved by the Commanding Officer.

(b) (6) performed the only inspection accomplished on the rear ejection seat, and canopy system. (b) (6) signed off the first major inspection as a complete Safety and Survival Systems Inspector when he had only been designated as an Oxygen Systems Inspector. However, all indications from squadron personnel in a supervisory capacity claim (b) (6) to be qualified and trained to perform this work even though present procedures to designate him as such had not been accomplished.

Sixty hours subsequent to the first major inspection where the seat was pulled for the only time a second intermediate inspection was completed on 18 April 1961. The Safety and Survival section of this inspection was performed as follows:

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 7O OPNAVINST 3750.6D

(b) (6) AMS2 Performed Work
(b) (6) AMS2 Systems Inspector

The qualifications of these persons follow:

(b) (6) AMS2

Reported aboard	24 May 1959	AMSAA
Designated	16 Dec 1959	AMS3
Designated	16 Nov 1960	AMS2

Schools attended:
A/P Graduated 49 in class of 92 23 Jan 1959
AMS(A) Graduated 14 in class of 20 17 Apr 1959
NAMO TRA DET T2J-1 (A/F) Jul 1959
Systems Inspector: T2V-1 Oxygen system. Score 3.5
Designated 22 Jan 1960
Started working in AME Shop in October 1960

(b) (6) AM2

Reported aboard	31 Oct 1958	AMSAA
Designated	16 Jan 1959	AMS3
Designated	16 May 1960	AMS2

Schools attended:
A/P Graduated 53 in class of 143 18 Jul 1958
AMS(A) Graduated 13 in class of 31 Oct 1958
NAMO TRA DET T2J-1 (A/F) Jul 1960
Systems Inspector: T2J Airframes systems exam. Score 3.5 Designated 22 Jan 1960
Started working in AME Shop in November 1960.

Item 2 (e) of the Safety and Survival section of the Intermediate Inspection calls for an inspection of the aneroid mount, arming pin and thruster rod for security. This area encompasses the bell crank which had the missing pivot pin. Both the person performing the work and the person performing the inspection are confident that the pin was installed at the time of this inspection.

Both (b) (6) and (b) (6) are considered highly qualified and conscientiously performed this inspection.

It is the Maintenance Officer's opinion that the missing bell crank pivot pin was installed at the factory with the cotter key end facing inward and was at least partially in the bell crank pivot point at the time of the first major and the second intermediate inspection. Had it not been in, it is felt that an obvious misalignment of the bell crank would have been noted.

Indentations and red paint from the washers indicate that a pin had been installed at one time and that a cotter key was used, although not necessarily bent for security. In view of the above it is felt that most probably the pin backed out of its retainer during the last 60.5 hours of flight because of constant insertion and removal of the safety pin.

There is nothing factual from available records that would lead to an answer as to why the gas line was disconnected. It was required to be inspected only during the first major. (b) (6) had signed the work order as having performed the work and (b) (6) had signed as Systems Inspector

for the work. (b) (6) cannot remember this aircraft but states that he is familiar with the importance of this particular inspection, and actually makes the inspection when he is acting as Systems Inspector. However, records do not indicate any work done in the gas line after the inspection by (b) (6) and (b) (6). It must be concluded that the line was disconnected at the time of the check but was not noted by either (b) (6) or (b) (6).

(b) (6)

[redacted]

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 70 OPNAVINST 3750.6D

AIRCRAFT FIRE/RESCUE REPORT
NAVWEPS FORM 11135/1 (8-60)

NO TRANSMITTAL LETTER REQUIRED

REPORT SYMBOL NAVWEPS 11135-1

ORIGINAL

STATION AND LOCATION	DATE OF REPORT	AFRR NO.
U. S. Naval Auxiliary Air Station Kingsville, Texas	26 May 1961	10-61
	DATE AND TIME OF INCIDENT: 25 May 1961 0849	ON STATION: X / OFF STATION:
REPORTING CUSTODIAN: VT-7	MODEL AIRCRAFT INVOLVED: T-2J	BUREAU NO.: 142222

TO: Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons (SEEQ)

VIA — MILITARY COMMAND: Chief of Naval Air Advanced Training Command; SIGNATURE:

EXACT LOCATION OF INCIDENT: 300 yards south of roll-off end of runway 17 at South Field.

TYPE OF INCIDENT						FIRE INVOLVED		ESTIMATED CAUSE
TAKE-OFF	X	LINE OR LOADING		FUELING		YES	X	To be determined by AAR Board
LANDING		PARKED		MAINTENANCE		NO		
TAXIING		DEFUELING		INFLIGHT		IMPACT IGNITION	X	
OTHER (Specify)						DELAYED IGNITION		

CONDITIONS AT TIME OF INCIDENT

GENERAL WEATHER PICTURE		NATURE OF TERRAIN AT AND IN APPROACH TO INCIDENT
High broken, 10 mile visibility	WIND DIRECTION: South Southwest	Rough Terrain
	WIND VELOCITY (mph): 7 Knots	
	TEMPERATURE (°F): 84°	

LIQUID FUEL QUANTITY

		OTHER FUELS
ESTIMATED ON BOARD BEFORE INCIDENT (lbs)	3781	None
ESTIMATED ON BOARD AFTER INCIDENT (lbs)	None	
ESTIMATED SPILL AREA (Size in feet)		

PERSONNEL RESCUE

		DESCRIBE RESCUE METHODS USED
NO. PERSONNEL ON BOARD AIRCRAFT	2	None required
NO. PERSONNEL SURVIVED	1	
NO. PERSONNEL ESCAPED UNAIDED	1	
NO. PERSONNEL RESCUED	0	

FIRE FIGHTING

FIRST METHOD OF ALARM USED						TIME RECORD	
TWO-WAY RADIO		EMERGENCY INTER-COM.	X	EMERGENCY PHONE	X	TIME ALARM RECEIVED	0849
OTHER METHOD (State)						TIME EQUIPMENT ARRIVED	0850

STATION EQUIPMENT

EACH EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE AT INCIDENT		NO. PERSONNEL MANNING EQUIPMENT		QUANTITY EXTINGUISHING AGENTS USED	
TYPE	NO. LOADS USED	MIL.	CIV.	FOAM (gals. conc. used)	OTHER TYPES AND QUANTITIES
		SEE ENCLOSURE (1)			

STATION EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE

TYPE	DEFICIENCY	NO. OF DAYS	EXPLAIN DELAYS TO REPAIR
NB-1 71-00524	Complete Motor Overhaul	261	Funds received 5-25-61 for repairs
NB-1 71-00622	Automatic Choke & Fuel Leak	1	In process
NB-1 71-00077	Oil Leak - Main Engine	2	In process
Tankcraft 96-19034	Tank Rusted Out	59	Waiting on instructions for disposition

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 70 OPNAVINST 3750.6D
ENCLOSURE (7)

DESCRIPTION OF DIFFICULTIES IN FIRE CONTROL AND EXTINGUISHMENT DUE TO UNUSUAL CONDITIONS OR EQUIPMENT AND/OR AGENT INADEQUACIES

Difficulty was encountered in reaching the crash site due to heavy undergrowth brush and rough eroded condition of terrain. Aircraft landed in washed out gully approximately twenty feet wide and fifteen feet deep.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN EQUIPMENT AND/OR PROCEDURES TO INCREASE EFFICIENCY

NONE

Orig & 1 SEEC Via
CNAVANTRA
CNATRA
AAR BOARD (VT-7)
CENTRAL FILES
CRASH OFFICER
OPERATIONS OFFICER

MONETARY LOSSES (Estimated)

PERCENT DAMAGE BY IMPACT	PERCENT DAMAGE BY FIRE	LOSS TO SURROUNDING PROPERTY
To be deter-mined by AAR Board	To be deter-mined by AAR Board	None

DATE	PREPARED BY (Name and title)	SIGNATURE
25 May 61	(b) (6) [redacted] Crash Capt. GS-6	

DATE	STATION COMMANDING OFFICER	SIGNATURE
31 MAY 1961	C. W. HARBERT CAPT USN COMMANDING OFFICER	

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 70 OPNAVINST 3750.6D

DIAGRAM OF INCIDENT SHOWING WIND, DIRECTION, APPROACH OF EQUIPMENT, POSITION OF AIRCRAFT, DISTANCES, ETC.
(Maps and photographs should be included, if significant)

ORIGINAL



SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 70 OPNAVINST 3750.6D

ENCLOSURE (7)

FULL DESCRIPTION OF FIREFIGHTING OR PROTECTION AT INCIDENT

At 0849, 25 May 1961, the intercommunication and the crash circuit were activated by South Field Tower to report that a plane had crashed off of the roll-off end of runway 17 at South Field.

MB-5 #71-01286 was on the hardstand observing airfield operations. Aircraft number 148222 was observed rolling off runway 17 at high speed. Crew on the truck also noticed what appeared to be two ejection seats leaving the aircraft. MB-5 #71-01286 responded immediately toward aircraft and reached crash area at approximately 0850. The truck made setup position southeast of aircraft due to extremely precipitous terrain conditions and extinguishing procedures were started immediately.

MB-5 #71-01036 arrived at crash scene at approximately 0851. The Crash Captain and crew from MB-5 #71-01286 immediately located both pilots of aircraft. Pilot #1 was located approximately 78 paces southwest of aircraft; Pilot #2 was located approximately 125 paces south of aircraft. Number 1 was fatally injured. Pilot #2 was seriously injured and administered to by the Medical Officer at the scene.

Approximately 2½ minutes elapsed when Fire Chief's pickup #94-31431, Assistant Fire Chief's pickup #94-29122, and Structural pumpers #73-01144 and #73-01454 arrived at the scene. Both Structural pumpers setup positions northeast of aircraft and assisted crash crew. Final extinguishment was accomplished at approximately 0916.

After fire was extinguished all equipment, except MB-5 #71-01036, was secured from emergency. MB-5 #71-01036 stoodby while investigating officers at crash scene investigated.

Extreme difficulty was encountered in reaching aircraft due to heavy brush and large washouts around aircraft and on base road.

STATION EQUIPMENT

EACH EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE AT INCIDENT		NO. PERSONNEL MANNING EQUIPMENT		QUANTITY EXTINGUISHING AGENTS USED	
TYPE	NO. LOADS USED	MIL.	CIV.	FOAM (gals.conc. used)	OTHER TYPES AND QUANTITIES
Pickup			1	None	None
Pickup			1	None	None
Power Wagon		1	1	None	None
Power Wagon			1	None	None
MB-5	1	4		20 gallons of foam	600 gallons of water
MB-5		5			200 gallons of water
MB-1		5		None	None
Pumper (750GPM)			5	None	None
Pumper (750GPM)			5	None	None

ORIGINAL

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 7C OPNAVINST 5750.6D ENCLOSURE (1)

Enclosure (1)

AIRCRAFT CLEARANCE

(DELIVER DUPLICATE TO BASE OPERATIONS AT DESTINATION)

ORIGINAL

DATE: 25 May 1961

A. OPERATIONS OFFICE: NAAS KINGSVILLE

AIRCRAFT SERIAL NO.: 148222

B. OCCUPANTS (State whether crew or passenger. List additional occupants on separate sheet and attach.)

DUTY	NAME AND INITIALS	GRADE	SERVICE NO.	ORGANIZATION	HOME STATION
PILOT IN COMMAND	(b) (6)	CAPT	(b) (6)	USMC	NQI
DP	SECKINGER, N. V.	LCDR		USN	NQI

VRF SIDE NO. 177

C. FLIGHT PLAN

RADIO CALL: NJ-148222

AIRCRAFT TYPE: T2J

ROUTE TO BE FLOWN

IFR	VFR	ALTITUDE	ROUTE	TO
	X	30,000	DIRECT	HOUSTON
	X	30,000	DIRECT	NEW ORLEANS
	X	30,000	DIRECT	PENSACOLA NAS

POINT OF DEPARTURE: NAAS KINGSVILLE

BASE NAME OF DESTINATION: NAS PENSACOLA

MILEAGE: 605 NAUT. | ETD: 1445Z

EST TRUE A/S: 320 KTS | ETE: 1+50

ALTERNATE: N/R | ETE TO ALTERNATE: N/R

TRANS. FREQ.: ALL UHF + G

PILOT'S LAST NAME: (b) (6)

FUEL ON BOARD: 2 HRS. 30 MIN.

INSTRUMENT RATING

NAVY	AIR FORCE	ARMY
SPECIAL PILOT	PILOT RATING	PILOT RATING
STANDARD PILOT X	INST RATING	INST RATING

DATE INSTRUMENT CARD EXPIRES: FEB 24 1962

DD FORM 366 FILED AT: | DATE FILED:

HIGHEST RANK ON BOARD: LCDR USN

CERTIFIED TO BE A TRUE COPY (b) (6)

LETDOWN EQUIPMENT ABOARD AIRCRAFT									LETDOWN AVAILABLE AT DESTINATION									NOTAMS CHECKED			
ILS		VOR		ADF		RADIO RANGE	X	TACAN	ILS	X	VOR	X	ADF	X	GCA	X	RADIO RANGE	X	TACAN	X	YES		NO

REMARKS
1. NO IFF ABOARD
2. TACAN ONLY A/C
3. FERRY A/C VFR ONLY

/s/ (b) (6)
(SIGNATURE OF PILOT)

D. WEATHER BRIEFED

EXISTING: DESTINATION: P&S 15SCTD E30 BRKN/OVCSTR | TIME OF OBS: 0700C | ALTERNATE: N/R | TIME OF OBS:

FORECAST: DESTINATION (ETA): 15SCTD V BKN 7CBRN/BRKN8 RISK 7 HW'S 3005 | ALTERNATE (ETE): N/R

MIN CIG 1200 FT	TEX	MAX CLD TOPS 33M CIR FT MSL		THUNDERSTORMS MSY SCTD PNS		TURBC LGT	HAIL
MIN VIS FLT LVL 15		MAX WIND	X	SMOKE		RAIN SCTD IN R + F	FOG
FREEZING LVL 11000 FT MSL		ICING		FRZ PCPN		SNOW	BRIEFING GOOD AFTER 1545Z
WIND 30/260/50						SIGNATURE	/s/ (b) (6)

FLIGHT CLEARANCE AUTHORIZATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO: SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPNAVINST 3750.6B

INSTRUCTIONS AS TO RADIO OR TOWER CONTACT:

ACTUAL T.O. TIME:

STATION ARRIVED AT: | TIME: | NAME: | GRADE OR POSITION:

SIGNATURE OF CLEARING AUTHORITY: C. W. HARBERT CAPT USN /s/ (b) (6)

DD FORM 1 OCT 56 175 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED.

ENCLOSURE 8

BCL (8)

1. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY: NAS Pensacola
2. REPORT NO.: 988
3. DATE: 6-12-61
4. ASSEMBLY NOMENCLATURE: Fuel Pump
5. ASSEMBLY MOD: 1067581
6. ASSEMBLY SER: 408
7. MFGR.'S CODE: 77200
8. DATE REMOVED: 5-25-61
9. ENGINE MOD: J34-WE-48
10. ENGINE SER: WE 220690
11. TOTAL HOURS: 251.4
12. HOURS SINCE LAST O/H: New
13. DATE LAST O/H: —
14. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY: —
15. NO. PREV. O/H'S: 0
16. REASON FOR REMOVAL AND CODE: Accident Damage 4D
17. OPERATING ACTIVITY: VT-7
18. AMPFUR/AAR/FLIGA SER: 899
19. AC/MISSILE MOD: T2J-1
20. AC/MISSILE BUNO: 148222

24. DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS (Include name of Primary Part Failure) [CODE]

BUWEPSFLDSUPREP CEN MSG 021946Z of June 1961 refers

1. Disassembly inspection revealed serious heat damage on all external and internal parts.

2. No indication of malfunction or material failure was found.

COPY TO:
BUWEPS (FWAE-4)
BUWEPS (RAPP-2)
NAVAVSAFCEN
BUWEPS REP EAST HARTFORD
CNATRA
CNABATRA
BUWEPSFLDSUPREP CEN
VT-7 (A/C MAINT OFFICER)
VT-7 (AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER)
BUWEPSREP COLUMBUS

21. PRIMARY PART FAILURE	COND.
NO.	

22. PARTS REMOVED	COND.
NO.	

23. APPLICABLE BULS., CHGS., ETC., INCORPORATED	YES	NO
NUMBER		

25. CONCLUSIONS (Para. Nos. correspond to paragraph numbers under Findings)

1. Resulted from fire after accident.

26. RECOMMENDATIONS [CODE]

None

PRIORITY - DIR

27. SIGNATURE (b) (6) [redacted]
28. TITLE: Aero. Engr. Supt.
6-15-61

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION REPORT NAVAER-2901 (REV. 12-58)

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1. OVERHAUL ACTIVITY: NAS Pensacola
2. REPORT NO.: 989
3. DATE: 6-12-61
4. ASSEMBLY NOMENCLATURE: Fuel Control
5. ASSEMBLY MOD: 1097632
6. ASSEMBLY SER: 521410
7. MFGR.'S CODE: 66903
8. DATE REMOVED: 5-25-61
9. ENGINE MOD: J34-WE-48
10. ENGINE SER: WE220690
11. TOTAL HOURS: 251.4
12. HOURS SINCE LAST O/H: New
13. DATE LAST O/H: —
14. LAST OVERHAUL ACTIVITY: —
15. NO. PREV. O/H'S: 0
16. REASON FOR REMOVAL AND CODE: Accident Damage 4D
17. OPERATING ACTIVITY: VT-7
18. AMPFUR/AAR/FLIGA SER: 860
19. AC/MISSILE MOD: T2J-1
20. AC/MISSILE BUNO: 148222

24. DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS (Include name of Primary Part Failure) [CODE]

BUWEPSFLDSUPREP CEN MSG 021946Z of June 1961 refers

1. Disassembly inspection revealed serious heat damage on all external and internal parts.

2. No indication of malfunction or material failure was found.

COPY TO:
BUWEPS (FWAE-4)
BUWEPS (RAPP-2)
NAVAVSAFCEN
BUWEPS REP EAST HARTFORD
CNATRA
CNABATRA
BUWEPSFLDSUPREPCEN
VT-7 (A/C MAINT OFFICER)
VT-7 (AVIATION SAFETY OFFICER)
BUWEPS REP COLUMBUS

21. PRIMARY PART FAILURE	COND.
NO.	

22. PARTS REMOVED	COND.
NO.	

23. APPLICABLE BULS., CHGS., ETC., INCORPORATED	YES	NO
NUMBER		

25. CONCLUSIONS (Para. Nos. correspond to paragraph numbers under Findings)

1. Resulted from fire after accident

26. RECOMMENDATIONS [CODE]

None

PRIORITY - DIR

27. SIGNATURE (b) (6) [redacted]
28. TITLE: Aero. Engr. Supt.
6-15-61

DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION REPORT NAVAER-2901 (REV. 12-58)

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 1
OPNAV FORM 3750-8 (Rev. 5-58)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7
See OPNAVINST. 3750.6C for instructions - SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

SECTION A - IDENTIFICATION

1. FROM (Name and mailing address of activity)	2. MOR NUMBER
VT-7 NAAS Kingsville, Texas	6-61

3. REPORT FILED BY (Name and Signature of Medical Officer)	DATE	4. FORWARDED (Name and Signature of Appointing Authority)	DATE
[redacted], LT MC USNR	JUN 19 196[redacted]	CDR USN	

5. TYPE OF MISHAP	6. TIME AND ZONE	7. DATE	8. GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION
[X] ACCIDENT [ ] GROUND ACCIDENT [ ] INCIDENT	0818 S	25 May 1961	South Field, NAAS Kingsville, Texas

9. MODEL A/C	10. BUNO	11. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	12. TYPE ACCDT.	13. DAMAGE CODE	14. UNIT OPERATING A/C
T2J-1	148222	2	S1	A	VT-7 NAAS, Kingsville, Texas

15. INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED - USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF REQUIRED. NAME (Last, first and middle initials)	16. UNIT TO WHICH ATTACHED	17. RANK, RATE	18. FILE/SERV. NO. DESIGNATOR	19. BILLET	20. BRANCH OF SERVICE	21. INJURY CODE	22. DISPOSITION
IN CONTROL OF A/C a. SMITH, [redacted]	VT-7	CAPT	[redacted]	Instructor	USMC	G	X
b. SECKINGER, Neil Vincent	VT-7	LCDR		Asst. Maint. Officer	USN	A	X
c.							
d.							

23. CLARIFICATION OF ITEMS 15-22 WHEN NECESSARY

24. MODEL - OTHER A/C IF INVOLVED	25. BUNO	26. NO. OF OCCUPANTS	27. UNIT OPERATING A/C	28. DAMAGE CODE	29. REPORT NO.

30. DETAILED NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF ACCIDENT (Use additional 8 X 10½ plain sheets if required)

On 25 May 1961, CAPT [redacted] signed out for T2J-1, bureau number 148222 with LCDR SECKINGER as dual pilot for a ferry flight from NAAS Kingsville, Texas to NAS PENSACOLA, FLORIDA.

The aircraft was pre-flighted by both pilots and no discrepancies were noted. The pilots strapped in with CAPT [redacted] in the front cockpit and LCDR SECKINGER in the rear cockpit.

CAPT [redacted] went over the pre-start check-off list and started the aircraft. The start was normal and CAPT [redacted] went over his pre-taxi check-off list. He noted that the speed brakes did not extend when he pressed the switch to extend the speed brakes. The speed brakes indicator would show barber pole as he pressed the switch and then would immediately show in when he let go of the switch. A communications check on the intercommunications system was made and it worked normal. The oxygen masks were not fully put on by either pilot.

CAPT [redacted] then taxied out to the duty runway completing his pre-take-off check-off list while taxiing except for the canopy and his shoulder harness.

(CONTINUED ON ATTACHED SHEET)

SECTION B - MEDICAL OFFICER'S QUESTIONNAIRE

YES	NO	DID THE FLIGHT SURGEON:	(If "NO" state reason in space below.)
X		1. VISIT THE SCENE OF THE MISHAP?	
X		2. PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE FIELD INVESTIGATION?	
X		3. PARTICIPATE FULLY IN THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE A/C ACCIDENT BOARD?	

GIVE APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF HOURS SPENT BY THE FLIGHT SURGEON:	4. IN FIELD INVESTIGATION	5. IN BOARD DELIBERATIONS	6. IN PREPARATION OF THIS REPORT
	16	6	16

7. REPORT PREPARATION CHECK LIST

[X] ALL PARTS OF FORM COMPLETED [X] SURVIVORS NARRATIVES [X] PHOTOS [X] CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS [X] REQUIRED COPIES FURNISHED

ENCL (9)

(CONTINUATION OF SECTION A, #30, VT-7 MCR 6-61)

CAPT (b) (6) requested and received clearance for take-off. As he taxied into position for take-off, he closed the canopy and locked his shoulder harness and put the flaps up for a flaps up take-off.

CAPT (b) (6) applied full throttle control while holding his brakes and as soon as the engine tachometer indicated 100% RPM, CAPT (b) (6) released the brakes and started the take-off roll.

CAPT (b) (6) noted the oil pressure was low (estimate 70 LBS pressure) and tried to tell LCDR SECKINGER in the rear cockpit about it. He held his oxygen mask over his face with his left hand as he pushed the intercom switch to "CALL" but was unable to get a response from LCDR SECKINGER. The other instruments indicated the engine was operating normally.

LCDR SECKINGER spoke on the intercom shortly after this, but CAPT (b) (6) did not understand what was said.

The take-off roll continued until 100 kts was reached and CAPT (b) (6) tried to raise the nose to take-off attitude. The nose would not come up even though an airspeed of 110 to 115 kts had been attained. CAPT (b) (6) tried a second time to raise the nose to take-off attitude, but to no avail.

When the nose did not come up on this second attempt, CAPT (b) (6) decided to abort the take-off. He reduced power to idle, turned off some switches and reached for the hook, but he saw he was past the runway arresting gear. He pulled the stick full back and applied full brake and saw he couldn't stop the aircraft before going off the end of the runway.

Inasmuch as there was no runway over-run, CAPT (b) (6) pulled the ejection curtain at the end of the runway. The ejection control was in the front cockpit and both pilots were ejected through the canopy.

CAPT (b) (6) section of the ejection system worked as it was designed to do, with the exception of the canopy. The distance from point of initiation to touchdown was 624 feet. LCDR SECKINGER went 599 feet from the end of the runway in the seat. Seat separation did not occur due to the fact that the striker air pivot clevis pin in the aneroid linkage was missing.

The aircraft rolled off the end of the runway into a deep gully and came to rest 491 feet from the end of the runway. The aircraft caught fire immediately. The crash crew arrived on the scene shortly thereafter and took charge.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT - PAGE 2

OPNAV FORM 3750-6A (Rev. 5-58)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION C - PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle)

(b) (6)

MODEL A/C

T2J-1

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional BUIONS plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight
			2. "G" forces
			3. Environmental stress - External
			4. - Internal
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression
			6. Diet
			7. Fatigue
			8. Hypoxia
			9. Related illness
			10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions
			11. Hyperventilation
			12. Drugs
			13. Physical state
			14. OTHER:
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:
			15. Personal equipment
			16. Displays and/or controls
			17. Work arrangement
			18. Working environment
			19. Habit interference
			20. OTHER:
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from non-duty sources)
			21. Pregnancy
			22. Illness or death
			23. Arguments
			24. Elated/Depressed state
			25. Personal habits - Drinking
			26. - Sex
			27. - Gambling
			28. - Debts

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from duty sources)
			29. Expeditings/Delays
			30. Weather
			31. Mechanical Problems
			32. Social and working relationships
			33. Personal confort
			34. Regulations
			35. Facilities
			36. Navigation
			37. Duty assignment
			38. Personality traits
			NON-STRESS FACTORS:
			39. Faulty attention
X			40. Poor judgement (See Section E, Par. 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e)
			41. Forgetfulness
			42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			TRAINING FACTORS:
			43. Physiological training
			44. Emergency Procedures training
			45. Survival and rescue training
			46. Refresher training
			47. Transition training
			48. OTHER:

SECTION D - AIR CREW DATA (Fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	30.1	7. Total time in model	330.7
2. Flight time last 24 hours	3.0	8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason	0
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	2.0		
4. Time at controls this flight	0.1	9. Number of and dates of previous accidents	0
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	10.0		
6. Total flight time	1621.9		

SECTION E - CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSES (As condensed from Part I, Item 30 and Part VIII of the AAR)

NOTE: Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.

SEE ATTACHED SHEETS.

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SECTION C—PHYSIOLOGICAL, HUMAN ENGINEERING, DESIGN, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND TRAINING FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED IN SOME DEGREE TO THIS A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): **SECKINGER, Neil Vincent**

MODEL A/C: **T2J-1**

Check E-Established, S-Suspected, or P-Present for each factor selected. Additional 8X10½ plain sheets will be used for the supporting account of items checked below. Identify each statement with the factor and section identification (e.g., C1, C2, etc.). Attach all sheets pertaining to these factors to this form upon completion.

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			PHYSIOLOGICAL:
			1. Physically incapacitated in flight
			2. "G" forces
			3. Environmental stress - External
			4. - Internal
			5. Dysbarism/explosive decompression
			6. Diet
			7. Fatigue
			8. Hypoxia
			9. Related illness
			10. Vertigo/Disorientation/Illusions
			11. Hyperventilation
			12. Drugs
			13. Physical state
			14. OTHER:
			HUMAN ENGINEERING AND DESIGN:
			15. Personal equipment
			16. Displays and/or controls
			17. Work arrangement
			18. Working environment
			19. Habit interference
			20. OTHER:
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from non-duty sources)
			21. Pregnancy
			22. Illness or death
			23. Arguments
			24. Elated/Depressed state
			25. Personal habits - Drinking
			26. - Sex
			27. - Gambling
			28. - Debts

E	S	P	✓ FACTORS
			SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL: (Emotional stress from duty sources)
			29. Expeditings/Delays
			30. Weather
			31. Mechanical Problems
			32. Social and working relationships
			33. Personal comfort
			34. Regulations
			35. Facilities
			36. Navigation
			37. Duty assignment
			38. Personality traits
			NON-STRESS FACTORS:
			39. Faulty attention
X			40. Poor judgement (See Section E, Par. 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e)
			41. Forgetfulness
			42. OTHER SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
			TRAINING FACTORS:
			43. Physiological training
			44. Emergency Procedures training
			45. Survival and rescue training
			46. Refresher training
			47. Transition training
			48. OTHER:

SECTION D — AIR CREW DATA (fill in where applicable)

1. Flight time past 30 days	14.6	7. Total time in model	77.1
2. Flight time last 24 hours	0.0	8. Number of days grounded last month, give reason	
3. Number of flights in last 24 hours	0.0		0
4. Time at controls this flight	0.0	9. Number of and dates of previous accidents	
5. Number of hours duty last 24 hours	8.0	One accident (engine failure): 2 Nov 1964	
6. Total flight time	4036.5	T2J-1 FCLP	

SECTION E — CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THEIR ANALYSIS (As condensed from Part I, Sect. D and Part VIII of the ARR)

NOTE: **Fill in this section only on that set of forms prepared for FIRST individual listed in Section A, i.e. 15(a). Attach additional sheets as necessary.**

SEE ATTACHED SHEETS.

☆U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960—576988

SUPPLEMENT TO PAGE 2, SECTION E, VT-7 MOR 6-61

1. THE TAKE-OFF - In view of the flaps up take-off test conducted and the flaps up take-off information received from the Field Engineering Trainer Group, NAA, Columbus, Ohio, this aircraft should have become airborne when the stick was brought back to the take-off attitude.

   The board was unable to determine the cause for the failure of the aircraft to assume a take-off attitude beyond the possibility of a failure or malfunction in the elevator control system. The elevator hydraulic boost actuator is being sent to O & R, Pensacola for DIR. The hydraulic lines on this actuator cannot be hooked up backwards due to non-compatible fittings.

   The control linkage in the cockpit areas was completely destroyed by the fire. The cause for the failure or malfunction of the elevator control system is therefore undetermined.

2. Procedures used.

   a. The pre-taxi check-off was performed while taxiing out, which was in violation of the squadron's operating procedures.

   b. The speed brakes not extending is reason enough for the pilot to down the aircraft for the following reasons:

      (1) The pilot did not know the reason the speed brakes would not extend.

      (2) The speed brakes not extending could be a possible indication of a failure in the hydraulic system.

   c. The pilot started his roll for take-off without checking all of his engine instruments. The pilot should not have started a take-off roll with the oil pressure gauge indicating low oil pressure (70 lbs). Minimum pressure for 100% is 114 lbs. Starting the take-off roll prior to checking all the engine instruments is in violation of the squadron's operating procedures.

   d. The decision of the pilot to make a flaps up take-off on a 6000 foot runway was very unwise and in violation of the squadron's operating procedures. The position at which TAKE-OFF was initiated was approximately 500 feet from the take-off end of the runway, therefore, the runway available for use was 5,500 feet.

      (1) The take-off distance for flaps up, under the conditions this attempt was made was a maximum of 3000 feet. The minimum stopping distance from 115 kts is 2320 feet. This requires 5320 feet of runway for take-off and abort without hesitation or indecision on the part of the pilot.

(2) The take-off distance for flaps down under the conditions this attempt was made requires a roll distance of 2300 feet and a lift off speed of 98 kts. The minimum stopping distance from 98 kts is 1720 feet. This requires 4020 feet for take-off and abort. This would leave 1480 feet of spare runway and if the abort had been done without hesitation, the aircraft could have come to a stop in the arresting gear, which is 1500 feet from the end of the runway. It is felt therefore that had a flaps down take-off been attempted, this accident could have been averted.

e. Neither pilot had his oxygen mask on which is in violation of Training Squadron SEVEN Instruction 10127.1B which is quoted in part "All personnel will wear the following items of flight clothing while flying in the T2J-1 aircraft: f. Oxygen mask from take-off to landing." (See enclosure 3A)

The pilots not having their masks on and being on cold mikes definitely added to the confusion during the take-off, when CAPT (b) (6) was unable to get LCDR SECKINGER's attention by clicking the intercom switch to "CALL" position.

All the above listed violations definitely added to the confusion of the take-off and possibly hindered the pilot from making the correct decision at the right time when the difficulty of not being able to raise the nose was encountered.

3. The ejection system.

a. The ejection was through the canopy due to the fact that the gas line to the canopy actuator was not attached. This item is on the maintenance major check sheet and was signed off as having been CHECKED on this aircraft during the last check.

b. The rear seat not separating from the pilot was due to the fact that the pivot pin in the striker bellcrank was missing at the time of ejection (See encl. 5M & 5N). There is evidence of wear in the striker bellcrank pivot pin hole indicating that the pivot pin had been installed at one time. Since there were no work orders issued requiring removal of this pivot pin, it is believed by the board, that this pin was not properly secured by a cotter pin at the time of installation or it was removed and reinstalled insecurely or not reinstalled at all without a work order being issued. All other seats of this squadron were inspected for missing pivot pins and all pivot pins were found in and properly secured. The maintenance inspection check sheet lists the emergid area as a check item, but does not spell out the items in this area, one of which is the anchor pin for the striker bellcrank.

c. Front seat. Everything in this seat system functioned as designed. It could not be determined as to how the "D" ring was pulled, but the initiators were fired. The pilot states he only pulled the curtain.

d. Oxygen masks.

(1) Neither pilot had his oxygen mask on completely. They were hanging by one Hardeman fitting from the helmet.

(2) The bailout bottle lasts from 2 to 3 minutes after ejection. CAPT (b)(6) was knocked unconscious when he hit the fence and by the time assistance arrived, it is believed he would have suffocated, had he had his mask on correctly. Since ground level ejections can end in rough terrain and the pilot can be injured there is a need for automatic release of the mask or some automatic device to let outside air into the system when the bailout bottle is empty after ejection.

SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): [redacted] (b) (6)

MODEL A/C: T2J-1

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO	DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT
1. Shoulder harness	X		MB-7 Par.Int.Harness	X			X	
2. Lap belt	X		Int. M/A 269-530-123	X			X	
3. Inertia reel	X		Talco-co Ballistic	X			X	
4. G-Suit		X	Not necessary					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		X	Not necessary					
6. Exposure suit		X	Not necessary					
7. Flight suit (Other than above)	X		Summer Flying	X			X	
8. Helmet	X		Air Force P-4A	X			X	See Encl. 5I and 5J
9. Goggles/Eyeshield	X		Air Force P-4A	X			X	See Encl. 5I and 5J
10. Shoes	X		Boondockers	X			X	
11. Gloves	X		Summer Flight Gloves		X			Habitually not put on by this pilot until A/C is airborne.
12. Life vest		X	Not necessary					
13. Life raft	X		MK III		X			
14. OTHER:								
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (Night)	X		MK-13 MOD 0		X			
16. - Flare (Day)	X		MK-13 MOD 0		X			
17. - Dye marker	X		FSN-NF-6850-285-8000		X			
18. - Radio		X	Not issued					
19. - Flashlight		X	Not necessary					
20. - Mirror	X		MK III		X			
21. OTHER:								
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife		X	Survival					
23. - First aid kit	X		Kit, First Air Aeronautic (Utilized - no)					
24. - Shelter								
25. - Food								
26. OTHER								
27. RESCUE - Vehicle	X		USN Ambulance	X			X	
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher								
29. OTHER								

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. MASK - MODEL OR TYPE: A13A
2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: None
3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: Robertshaw-Fulton
4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: None
5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER: [X] YES [ ] NO
6. IF NO, WHY NOT:
7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK: None
8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT 4.5 LITERS (Liquid) _____ P.S.I. (Gas); TIME OF ACCIDENT 4.5 LITERS (Liquid) _____ P.S.I. (Gas)
9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCDT. [ ] YES [X] NO
10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING [ ] 100% [ ] NORMAL
11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY. [X] YES [ ] NO
12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON. [ ] NO [X] YES See attached sheet

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: Parachute Release
14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: Integrated Harness
15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED? Immediately after ejection
16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [X] NO
17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. [ ] YES [X] NO
18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? [ ] YES [ ] NO

(Continued on OPNAV FORM 3750-8C)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1960-[illegible]

SUPPLEMENT TO PAGE 3, SECTION G, VT-7 MOR 6-61 (b) (6)

G-12

Neither pilot had his oxygen mask on which is in violation of Training Squadron SEVEN Instruction 10127.1B which is quoted in part "All personnel will wear the following items of flight clothing while flying in the T2J-1 aircraft: f. Oxygen mask from take-off to landing." (See encl. 3A). CAPT (b) (6) could give no explanation for not utilizing his oxygen equipment.

SECTION F - SAFETY, PERSONAL, AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT

Prepare a narrative account of damaged or failed items. Identify each item discussed (e.g., F1, F2, etc.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (*Last, first, middle*): **SECKINGER, Neil Vincent**

MODEL A/C: **T2J-1**

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT	AVAILABLE YES	AVAILABLE NO	SPECIFIC MODEL OR TYPE	UTILIZED YES	UTILIZED NO	FAILED YES	FAILED NO	DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT
1. Shoulder harness	X		NB-7 Par.Int.Harness	X			X	
2. Lap belt	X		Int. M/A 2A9-530-123	X			X	
3. Inertia reel	X		Talco-ee Ballistic	X			X	
4. G-Suit		X	Not necessary					
5. Pressure suit-full or partial		X	Not necessary					
6. Exposure suit		X	Not necessary					
7. Flight suit (*Other than above*)	X		Summer Flying	X			X	Scattered tears
8. Helmet	X		APH-5	X			X	See encl. 5-0 and 5P
9. Goggles/Eyeshield	X		APH-5	X			X	See encl. 5-0 and 5P
10. Shoes	X		Boondockers	X			X	
11. Gloves	X		Summer Flight Gloves	X			X	
12. Life vest		X	Not necessary					
13. Life raft	X		MK III		X			
14. OTHER:								
15. SIGNAL DEVICE - Flare (*Night*)	X		MK-13 MOD 0		X			
16. - Flare (*Day*)	X		MK-13 MOD 0		X			
17. - Dye marker	X		FSN-RF-6850-285-8000		X			
18. - Radio		X	Not issued					
19. - Flashlight		X	Not necessary					
20. - Mirror	X		MK III		X			
21. OTHER:								
22. SURVIVAL GEAR - Knife		X	Survival					
23. - First aid kit	X		Kit, First Aid, Aeronautic (Utilized - no)					
24. - Shelter								
25. - Food								
26. OTHER:								
27. RESCUE - Vehicle	X		USN Ambulance	X			X	
28. - Sling, Net, Stretcher								
29. OTHER:								

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE

OXYGEN EQUIPMENT

1. BASE - MODEL OR TYPE: **A13A**

2. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: **None**

3. REGULATOR - MODEL OR TYPE: **Robertshaw-Fulton**

4. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY: **None**

5. PREFLIGHTED BY USER? ☐ YES ☐ NO **UNKNOWN**

6. IF NO, WHY NOT

7. LIST DISCREPANCIES NOTED BY PREFLIGHT CHECK

8. OXYGEN SUPPLY: PRIOR TO FLIGHT **1.5** LITERS (*Liquid*) _____ P.S.I. (*Gas*) — TIME OF ACCIDENT **1.5** LITERS (*Liquid*) _____ P.S.I. (*Gas*)

9. WAS OXYGEN IN USE AT TIME OF ACCDT. ☐ YES ☒ NO

10. IF YES, WAS SELECTOR SETTING ☐ 100% ☐ NORMAL

11. WAS ALL OXYGEN EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR THIS FLIGHT AVAILABLE? IF NO, LIST ITEMS AND REASON WHY. ☒ YES ☐ NO

12. WAS OXYGEN MASK REMOVED AT ANY TIME IN FLIGHT? IF YES, GIVE DURATION AND REASON. ☐ NO ☒ YES **See attached sheet**

RELEASE DEVICES

13. TYPE CHUTE RELEASE DEVICE: **Pneumatic Release**

14. TYPE HARNESS RELEASE DEVICE: **Integrated Harness**

15. WHEN WERE RELEASE DEVICES ACTIVATED? **Not activated**

16. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. ☐ YES ☐ NO

17. WERE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED AFTER ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, STATE DIFFICULTIES, WHEN ENCOUNTERED AND CAUSE. ☐ YES ☐ NO

18. WAS LIFE VEST INFLATED PRIOR TO ACTIVATING RELEASE DEVICES? IF YES, WHAT DIFFICULTIES DID THIS PRODUCE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

(Continued on OPNAV FORM 3750-8C)

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961—

SUPPLEMENT TO PAGE 3, SECTION G, VT-7 MOR 6-61 (SECKINGER)

G-12

Neither pilot had his oxygen mask on which is in violation of Training Squadron SEVEN Instruction 10127.1B which is quoted in part "All personnel will wear the following items of flight clothing while flying in the T2J-1 aircraft: f. Oxygen mask from take-off to landing." (See encl. 3A)

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SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Contin.)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): (b) (6)

MODEL A/C: T2J-1

RESTRAINT HARNESS

19. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM, MODEL/TYPE: NB-7 Par. Torso Harness

20. INTEGRATED? [X] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON: Rocket Jet Connector Reversed

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR
[ ] NO [X] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY:
[ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [X] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT:
[X] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET: Air Force P-4A

26. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS: Hardeman fittings

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM:

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON
[X] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY:
[ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [X] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE: NB-7

31. LAST PACKING DATE: 27 March 61

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN: F-151300-5

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type)
[ ] NONE Master Specialty 1000-C

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY?
[X] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATION
[ ] MANUAL [X] AUTOMATIC?

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED:

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO, GIVE REASON
[X] YES [ ] NO

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: Estimated 35 FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS
[ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING: Horizontal

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING: Normal

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT
[X] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED?

44. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (List in sequence): Visual Flight Rules

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE: Erosion ditches, rocky terrain, trees, brush

46. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED?
[X] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [ ] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY
[ ] YES [X] NO Pilot not wearing mask

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED?
[ ] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS
[ ] TIGHT [X] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING OBTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY?
[ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type)
[ ] NONE Seat Pan

53. WAS PARAPACK LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY?
[ ] NO [ ] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL
[ ] NONE Ejection seat lecture, movie, and shots; Squadron lectures

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARAPACK DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTIVATED SUCCESSFULLY?
[ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON

OTHER

57. IF G SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR
[ ] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS G SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON
[ ] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED
Air Force P-4A Hard Hat

60. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS.
[ ] NO [X] YES See attached sheet.

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD.
[X] NO [ ] YES

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1960-[illegible]

SUPPLEMENT TO PAGE 4, SECTION G, VT-7 MCR 6-61 ([redacted])

G-60

CAPT [redacted] Air Force hard hat (P-4A) was found approximately 15-20 feet away from him when the reporting Flight Surgeon reached him. CAPT [redacted] elected to use the Air Force hard hat in preference to the standard Navy APH-5 by reason of not being able to achieve a proper fitting with the latter. It should be noted that said Air Force hard hat did not have a chin strap. The reporting Flight Surgeon feels that the lack of a chin strap and non-utilization of the Hardeman fittings were responsible for the loss of CAPT [redacted] hard hat. It is probable that CAPT [redacted] lost his hard hat on contact with the fence surrounding the reservation, immediately prior to contact with the ground.

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OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION G - DETAILED EQUIPMENT QUESTIONNAIRE (Continued)

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): **SECKINGER, Neil Vincent**

MODEL A/C: **T2J-1**

RESTRAINT HARNESS

19. INTEGRATED HARNESS SYSTEM MODEL/TYPE: **NB-7 Par.Torso Harness**

20. INTEGRATED? [X] FULL [ ] PARTIAL

21. MODIFICATIONS, IF ANY STATE REASON: **Rocket Jet Connector Reversed**

22. DID INTEGRATED HARNESS FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR
[ ] NO [X] YES

23. INTEGRATED HARNESS FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY
[ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [X] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

24. IF SHOULDER HARNESS WAS USED, WAS IT
[ ] LOCKED [ ] UNLOCKED [ ] TIGHT [ ] SLACK [ ] OTHER CONDITION **UNKNOWN**

HELMET

25. TYPE HELMET: **APH-5**

26. LIST PRESCRIBED MODIFICATIONS: **Chin and nape straps; Hardeman fittings**

27. OTHER MODIFICATIONS AND REASON FOR THEM: **None**

28. DID HELMET FIT PROPERLY? IF NO, GIVE REASON
[X] YES [ ] NO

29. HELMET FITTING WAS CONDUCTED BY
[ ] WEARER [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON [X] PARACHUTE RIGGER [ ] AVIATION EQUIPMENT OFFICER [ ] OTHER

PARACHUTE

30. TYPE CHUTE: **NB-7**

31. LAST PACKING DATE: **27 March 1961**

32. MODEL/TYPE BAILOUT OXYGEN: **F-151300-5**

33. AUTOMATIC RIPCORD, IF INSTALLED (Model and type)
[ ] NONE **Master Specialty 1000-C**

34. DID AUTOMATIC RIPCORD FAIL? IF YES, WHY? **See discussion of item H-6 for items 0-34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, & 41.**
[ ] NO

35. WAS RIPCORD ACTIVATION
[ ] MANUAL [ ] AUTOMATIC?

36. IF MANUALLY ACTIVATED STATE REASON AND ANY DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

37. DID CHUTE OPEN IMMEDIATELY? IF NO GIVE REASON
[ ] YES [ ] NO

38. ALTITUDE THAT CHUTE OPENED: FEET

39. OPENING SHOCK WAS
[ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

40. BODY ATTITUDE AT OPENING

41. CONDITION OF CHUTE AFTER OPENING

42. CHUTE OSCILLATION PRESENT
[ ] NONE [ ] SLIGHT [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

43. IF OSCILLATION WAS PRESENT, HOW WAS IT STOPPED?

44. WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING DESCENT (List in sequence): **VFR**

45. TOPOGRAPHY OF LANDING SITE: **Erosion ditches, rocky terrain, trees, brush**

46. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN CONNECTED?
[X] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT [ ] NO [ ] N.A.

47. WAS BAILOUT OXYGEN USED? IF NOT, WHY? **Pilot not wearing mask**
[ ] YES [X] NO

48. WHEN WAS IT ACTIVATED?
[X] BEFORE EXIT [ ] AFTER EXIT

49. GIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WITH BAILOUT OXYGEN AND THEIR CAUSE, IF ANY

50. WAS CHUTE HARNESS
[ ] TIGHT [X] SNUG [ ] LOOSE

51. WAS A SITTING POSITION IN SLING OBTAINED DURING DESCENT? IF NOT, WHY?
[ ] NO [ ] YES [ ] NOT ATTEMPTED

52. SEAT CUSHION IF PROVIDED (Model/Type)
[ ] NONE **Seat Pan**

53. WAS PARABAFT LANYARD CONNECTED TO LIFE VEST D RING? IF NOT, WHY?
[ ] NO [ ] YES

54. LIST TYPE OF PARACHUTE TRAINING COMPLETED BY THIS INDIVIDUAL
[ ] NONE **Ejection seat lecture, movie and shots; Squadron lectures**

55. IF ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO RELEASE PARABAFT DURING DESCENT, WAS RELEASE ACTIVATED SUCCESSFULLY?
[ ] YES [ ] NO

56. IF NO, GIVE REASON

OTHER

57. IF G SUIT, EXPOSURE SUIT, FULL OR PARTIAL PRESSURE SUIT WAS WORN, DID IT FIT PROPERLY? IF NOT, LIST DISCREPANCIES IN FIT AND GIVE REASONS THEREFOR
[ ] YES [ ] NO

58. WAS G SUIT EQUIPPED WITH A SPRING-LOADED DISCONNECT ADAPTER? IF NO, GIVE REASON
[ ] YES [ ] NO

59. LIST ALL ITEMS OF NON-STANDARD CLOTHING OR SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT UTILIZED

60. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT LOST? IF YES STATE ITEM, WHEN LOST, AND REASON FOR LOSS.
[ ] NO [X] YES **See attached sheet**

61. WAS ANY ITEM OF EQUIPMENT DISCARDED? IF YES, STATE ITEM, WHEN DISCARDED, AND REASON FOR DISCARD.
[X] NO [ ] YES

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SUPPLEMENT TO PAGE 4, SECTION G, VT-7 MOR 6-61 (SECKINGER, Neil Vincent)

G-60

LCDR SECKINGER's hard hat (APH-5) was lost, presumably, on his initial contact with the ground. Both chin strap and one Hardeman fitting were torn from the helmet (see enclosures 5-O and 5P). It is believed that non-utilisation of the Hardeman suspension was responsible for the loss of LCDR SECKINGER's hard hat and, subsequently, for a portion of the severe and extensive cranio-cerebral trauma sustained on impact with the ground.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 5

OPNAV FORM 3750-8D (Rev. 5-58) OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION A - EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): (b) (6) [redacted]

MODEL A/C: T2J-1

S	E	S-SUSPECTED, E-ESTABLISHED	REMARKS
	X	1. EJECTION - Attempted	
	X	2 - Accomplished	
	X	3 - Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
	X	4 - Prior to	
	X	5 - During	
	X	6 - Subsequent to	
		7 Give type and model of seat used	Seat Assembly, Pilot ejection 249-53009-61
		8 BAILOUT - Attempted	
		- Accomplished	

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (feet): ABOVE SEA LEVEL 52 ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY 0

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Attempted aborted take off

11. AIRSPEED: 110-115 kts

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: [ ] GROUND [ ] WATER

13. CONTROLLED? [ ] YES [ ] NO [ ] UNKNOWN

14. POWER: [ ] ON [ ] OFF

15. WHEELS: [ ] UP [ ] DOWN

16. FLAPS: [ ] FULL [ ] UP [ ] PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: [ ] OPEN [X] CLOSED [ ] JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE:

19. AIR TEMP.: 84 °F

20. WATER TEMP.: °F

21. A/C FLOATED: SEC

22. TIME IN WATER:

23. TIME IN RAFT:

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Ejection

25. IS THIS THE RECOMMENDED EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE: [X] YES [ ] NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: [ ] IN REACHING [ ] IN OPENING [ ] IN EXITING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY:

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT: Normal for ejection

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., H30, H31, etc.)

COMMUNICATIONS:		MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:	
	30. Communicated position prior to mishap		50. Items used as shelter
	31. Witnesses at scene		51. Items used as clothing
	32. Electronic signal devices		52. Fire
	33. Visual signal devices		53. OTHER:
	34. Auditory signal devices	ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:	
	35. OTHER:		54. Exposure to natural forces
TRAVEL:			55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
	36. LAND		56. Unfriendly native population
	37. WATER		57. OTHER:
SHELTER:		MORALE:	
	38. Life raft		58. Isolation
	39. Parachute		58. Psychological shock
	40. A/C structure		60. Lack of motivation to survive
	41. Natural shelter		61. Boredom
	42. Man-made shelter		62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
	43. OTHER:		63. OTHER:
WATER SOURCE:		FOOD SOURCE:	
	44. Desalter kit, seawater or solar still		64. Prepared survival rations
	45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.		65. Animals/plants
	46. Processed beverages		66. OTHER:
	47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.	SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP:	
	48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.		67. Survival course in basic - effective- ness unknown in this instance.
	49. OTHER:		

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MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 5
OPNAV FORM 3750-8D (REV. 5-58)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION A - EMERGENCY EXIT FROM A/C AND SURVIVAL FACTORS

NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): SECKINGER, Neil Vincent

MODEL A/C: T2J-1

S	E	S-SUSPECTED, E-ESTABLISHED	REMARKS
	X	1. EJECTION - Attempted	
	X	2 - Accomplished	
	X	3 - Through canopy	
YES	NO	EJECTION DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED	IF YES, EXPLAIN DIFFICULTIES
	X	4 - Prior to	
	X	5 - During	
X		6 - Subsequent to	See attached sheet
		7. Give type and model of seat used	Seat Assembly, pilot ejection 2h9-53009-61
		8. BAILOUT - Attempted	
		- Accomplished	

9. ALTITUDE AT TIME OF EXIT (feet): ABOVE SEA LEVEL 50 ABOVE TOPOGRAPHY 0

10. ATTITUDE OR MANEUVER OF A/C AT EXIT OR IMPACT: Attempted Aborted Take-off

11. AIRSPEED: 110-115 kts

12. COLLISION OF A/C WITH: ☐ GROUND ☐ WATER

13. CONTROLLED? ☐ YES ☐ NO ☐ UNKNOWN

14. POWER ☐ ON ☐ OFF

15. WHEELS ☐ UP ☐ DOWN

16. FLAPS ☐ FULL ☐ UP ☐ PARTIAL

17. CANOPY POSITION AT EXIT OR IMPACT: ☐ OPEN ☐ CLOSED ☒ JETTISONED

18. SEA STATE

19. AIR TEMP: 84 °F

20. WATER TEMP: °F

21. A/C FLOATED: SEC

22. TIME IN WATER

23. TIME IN RAFT

BAIL OUT OR COLLISION WITH WATER OR GROUND

24. EXIT USED: Ejection

25. IS THIS THE RECOMMENDED EXIT? IF NO STATE REASON FOR CHOICE. ☒ YES ☐ NO

26. DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS EXIT WERE: ☐ IN REACHING ☐ IN OPENING ☐ IN EXITING

27. STATE NATURE OF DIFFICULTY

28. BODY POSITION DURING EXIT: Normal for ejection

29. LIST OTHER FACTORS NOT INDICATED ABOVE WHICH AFFECTED EXIT FROM A/C

SURVIVAL FACTORS: Check factors below which are appropriate for this accident. Prepare a detailed narrative account of the factors checked below and attach to this form. Identify each item discussed by item number (e.g., H30, H31, etc.)

COMMUNICATIONS:		MAINTAINING BODY TEMPERATURE:	
	30. Communicated position prior to mishap		50. Items used as shelter
	31. Witnesses at scene		51. Items used as clothing
	32. Electronic signal devices		52. Fire
	33. Visual signal devices		53. OTHER:
	34. Auditory signal devices	ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS:	
	35. OTHER:		54. Exposure to natural forces
TRAVEL:			55. Exposure to dangerous animals and plants
	36. LAND		56. Unfriendly native population
	37. WATER		57. OTHER:
SHELTER:		MORALE:	
	38. Life raft		58. Isolation
	39. Parachute		59. Psychological shock
	40. A/C structure		60. Lack of motivation to survive
	41. Natural shelter		61. Boredom
	42. Man-made shelter		62. Rationing, activities, and group coordination
	43. OTHER:		63. OTHER:
WATER SOURCE:		FOOD SOURCE:	
	44. Desalter kit, seawater or solar still		64. Prepared survival rations
	45. Rain, dew, snow, ice, etc.		65. Animals/plants
	46. Processed beverages		66. OTHER:
	47. Canteen, thermos, water breaker, etc.	SURVIVAL TRAINING RECEIVED PRIOR TO MISHAP:	
	48. Streams, ponds, wells, etc.		67. Survival course in having effective use thereof in this instance.
	49. OTHER:		

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SUPPLEMENT TO PAGE 5, SECTION H, VT-7 MOR 6-61 (SECKINGER)

H-6

LCDR SECKINGER did not separate from his seat, and he came to rest, in the seat, 599 feet from the end of the runway. CAPT (b) (6) realised that there was no runway overrun and initiated ejection at the end of the runway. Ejection control was in the front cockpit and, therefore, CAPT (b) (6) had ejection control for both pilots.

Ejection system.

a. Rear seat S/NH-407

(1) Neither face curtain initiator (T-30E1) fired.

(2) Neither face curtain cable cutter fired.

(3) Harness release gun was not fired.

(4) Neither the seat bottom bladder nor its initiator (T31E1) inflated or fired.

(5) Neither back bladder nor its initiator(T-31E1) inflated or fired.

(6) The "D" ring handle was pulled and the 2 (T-30E1) initiators were fired.

(7) The seat drogue gun was fired.

(8) The aneroid unit - Arming pin was not pulled.

(9) Evidence strongly supports the fact that no pivot pin was in the striker bellcrank at the time of ejection. (See encl. 5M and 5N) Striker bellcrank engagement with the striker pin on the seat bulkhead produced sufficient rotation to pull firing pin from drogue gun, but the stroke was not sufficient to pull the aneroid aiming pin.

See Section E of this report.

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 6
OPNAV FORM 3750-8E (REV. 5-58)

OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION 1 - PATHOLOGICAL FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for POST MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle): [redacted]

MODEL A/C: T2J-1

2. AGE	3. HEIGHT	4. WEIGHT	5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT	6. INJURY CODE
31	72 INCHES	175	Pilot - forward cockpit; facing forward	C

7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: [x] SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE [ ] OTHER (give time)

8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases): None

HEAD INJURIES

9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION: [ ] MINOR [ ] SERIOUS [ ] CRITICAL [ ] FATAL

10. FACIAL INJURIES (n. e. c.): None

11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES: None

12. MINOR EYE INJURIES: [ ] RIGHT [ ] LEFT

13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES: [ ] RIGHT [ ] LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE: SKULL (CRAN, FACIAL); VERTEBRAE (Specify No.) (CERV., HOR., LUMBAR, SACRAL, COCCYX); SHOULDER GIRDLE; RIBS; PELVIS; UPPER ARM (R, L); LOWER ARM (R, L); HAND (R, L); UPPER LEG (R, L); LOWER LEG (R, L); FOOT (R, L)

SIMPLE / COMPOUND / COMMINUTED: [redacted]

DISLOCATION: JAW; SHOULDER; ELBOW; WRIST; HAND; HIP; KNEE; ANKLE; FOOT

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts):

16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION: None

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES: LACERATIONS (MILD, MODERATE, SEVERE); CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN (MILD, MODERATE, SEVERE); ABRASIONS (MILD, MODERATE, SEVERE)

HEAD (n. e. c.) VENTRAL / DORSAL; NECK; THORAX VENTRAL / DORSAL; ABDOMEN VENTRAL / DORSAL; EXTREMITIES UPPER / LOWER: [redacted]

18. [ ] DROWNED

19. [ ] ASPHYXIATED

20. SHOCK: [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

21. EXPOSURE: [ ] MILD [ ] MODERATE [ ] SEVERE

22. [ ] BURNS [ ] FROST BITE

DEGREE: 1ST, 2ND, 3RD; 1ST, 2ND, 3RD; 1ST, 2ND, 3RD

AREA: HEAD (ventral / Dorsal); TRUNK (ventral / Dorsal); ARMS; LEGS

23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: [ ] NONE [ ] COMPLETE

ARE TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE? [ ] YES [ ] NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS: [redacted]

25. DIAGNOSIS NO.: 8160

26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST: See attached sheet.

27. GROUNDED? IF YES GIVE REASON: [ ] YES [ ] NO

28. ESTIMATED DURATION: DAYS

29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-1294) NO. ______

30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH NO. ______

31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED? [ ] YES [ ] NO

32. PROTOCOL: [ ] ATTACHED [ ] WILL BE FORWARDED

33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY: [ ] PATHOLOGIST [ ] FLIGHT SURGEON

IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", AFIP-1957.

34. SPECIMEN		TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD	1	See attached sheet		TISSUE: (CNS)		
	2			MUSCLE		
	3			VISCERA		
URINE				OTHER:		
G-I CONTENTS						

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1958-O-

SUPPLEMENT TO PAGE 6, SECTION I, VT-7 MCR 6-61 (b) (6)

I-26

(b) (6) [redacted]

I-34

(b) (6) [redacted]

MEDICAL OFFICER'S REPORT OF A/C ACCIDENT, INCIDENT, OR GROUND ACCIDENT — PAGE 6
OPNAV FORM 3750-8E (Rev. 5-56) — OPNAV REPORT 3750-7

SECTION 1 - PATHOLOGICAL FACTORS (Use A to denote ANTE MORTEM; P for POST MORTEM, when known and applicable.)

1. NAME OF INDIVIDUAL (Last, first, middle)	MODEL A/C
SECKINGER, Neil Vincent	T2J-1

2. AGE	3. HEIGHT	4. WEIGHT	5. LOCATION AND DIRECTION FACING AT TIME OF ACCIDENT	6. INJURY CODE
38	66½ INCHES	143	Aft cockpit - facing forward	A

7. UNCONSCIOUSNESS: ☐ SHORT DURATION LITTLE SIGNIFICANCE ☐ OTHER (give time)
8. INTERNAL INJURIES (Non-fatal cases)

HEAD INJURIES
9. CEREBRAL CONCUSSION: ☐ MINOR ☐ SERIOUS ☐ CRITICAL ☒ FATAL
10. FACIAL INJURIES (e. p. c.)
11. INTRA-ORAL INJURIES: None
12. MINOR EYE INJURIES: ☒ RIGHT ☐ LEFT
13. MAJOR EYE INJURIES: ☐ RIGHT ☒ LEFT

14. TYPE OF FRACTURE — SKULL (CRAN, FACIAL); VERTEBRAE (Specify No.) (CERV., HOR., LUMBAR, SACRAL, COCCYX); SHOULDER GIRDLE; RIBS; PELVIS; UPPER ARM (R, L); LOWER ARM (R, L); HAND (R, L); UPPER LEG (R, L); LOWER LEG (R, L); FOOT (R, L)
SIMPLE / COMPOUND / COMMINUTED / DISLOCATION (SHOULDER, ELBOW, WRIST, HAND, HIP, KNEE, ANKLE, FOOT)

(b) (6) [redacted]

15. AMPUTATIONS/AVULSIONS (State Parts)
16. LIST PRE-EXISTING PHYSICAL DEFECTS PRESENT AT TIME OF POST CRASH EXAMINATION: None

17. SOFT TISSUE INJURIES — LACERATIONS (MILD, MODERATE, SEVERE); CONTUSION/SPRAIN/STRAIN (MILD, MODERATE, SEVERE); ABRASIONS (MILD, MODERATE, SEVERE)
HEAD (e. n. e. t.) VENTRAL / DORSAL; NECK; THORAX VENTRAL / DORSAL; ABDOMEN VENTRAL / DORSAL; EXTREMITIES UPPER / LOWER

(b) (6) [redacted]

18. ☐ DROWNED
19. ☐ ASPHYXIATED
20. SHOCK: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE
21. EXPOSURE: ☐ MILD ☐ MODERATE ☐ SEVERE

22. ☐ BURNS ☐ FROST BITE — DEGREE: 1ST 2ND 3RD / 1ST 2ND 3RD / 1ST 2ND 3RD — AREA: HEAD (ventral / Dorsal) TRUNK (ventral / Dorsal) ARMS LEGS
23. EXTENT OF CARBONIZATION: ☐ NONE ☐ COMPLETE — ARE TISSUE SPECIMENS OBTAINABLE? ☐ YES ☐ NO

NOTE: Attach a detailed narrative account of injuries, cause, structures causing injury, magnitudes of force, and include whether ANTE- OR POST-MORTEM if determined. It is necessary to give as clear a picture of injury cause and sequence as possible.

24. ADMITTED TO SICK LIST? IF YES, GIVE DIAGNOSIS ☐ YES ☐ NO — 25. DIAGNOSIS NO. (NAVMED P-5041) — 26. ESTIMATED STAY ON SICK LIST ___ DAYS
27. GROUNDED? IF YES GIVE REASON ☐ YES ☐ NO — 28. ESTIMATED DURATION ___ DAYS

29. PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (Use Basic Diagnostic Nomenclature, NAVMED P-5041): Injuries, Multiple, Extreme NO. 8603
30. SECONDARY CAUSE OF DEATH — NO.

31. AUTOPSY PERFORMED? ☒ YES ☐ NO — 32. PROTOCOL ☒ ATTACHED ☐ WILL BE FORWARDED — 33. AUTOPSY CONDUCTED BY ☒ PATHOLOGIST ☐ FLIGHT SURGEON — IF FLIGHT SURGEON DOES AUTOPSY USE "AUTOPSY GUIDE FOR A/C ACCIDENT FATALITIES", AFIP-1957.

34. SPECIMEN		TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS	SPECIMEN	TEST PERFORMED	RESULTS
BLOOD	1	CO	Less than 10%	TISSUE: (CNS)	Lactic Acid	175 mg%
	2	Alcohol	none found	MUSCLE		
	3			VISCERA		
URINE				OTHER:		
G.I. CONTENTS						

35. IF ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT OR OTHER SPECIALIZED INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURES WERE USED AT THE MISHAP SITE OR AUTOPSY, LIST THEM IN THIS SPACE. FOR EACH ENTRY IN THIS SPACE A NARRATIVE ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION WILL BE ATTACHED.

SUPPLEMENT TO PAGE 6, SECTION I, VT-7 MOR 6-61 (SECKINGER)

(b) (6)

[redacted]

Standard Form 503
Rev. Feb 1961
Promulgated
By Bureau of the Budget
Circular A—32

C O P Y

CLINICAL RECORD	AUTOPSY PROTOCOL				
DATE AND HOUR DIED: 5-25-61 0900 A.M. / P.M.	DATE AND HOUR AUTOPSY PERFORMED: 5-26-61 0830-1005 A.M. / P.M.	CHECK ONE	FULL AUTOPSY	HEAD ONLY	TRUNK ONLY
PROSECTOR: [redacted] LT MC USNR	ASSISTANT: M. E. KORNS, LT MC USNR		X		

CLINICAL DIAGNOSES (Including operations)

Aircraft accident. This LCDR was taking off from South Field, NAAS, Kingsville, Tex. in a T2J-1, BUNO 148222 when trouble developed and the aircraft crashed, with the pilot sustaining fatal injuries. Time of crash was 0900 on 25 May 1961.

CORONER'S CASE: R. J. Sims, County Coroner
Kleberg County
1217 West Richard
Kingsville, Texas

PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSES (PRELIMINARY)

[redacted]

APPROVED—SIGNATURE
[redacted] LT MC USNR

MILITARY ORGANIZATION (Unit symbol)	AGE	SEX	RACE	[redacted]	AUTOPSY NO.
LCDR/USN	38	Male	Cauc.	[redacted]	A61-45

PATIENT'S LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME	REGISTER NO.	WARD NO.
SECKINGER, Emil V.	101094-DD	DOA-Morgue

AUTOPSY PROTOCOL
Standard Form 503

(NAME OF HOSPITAL OR OTHER MEDICAL FACILITY AND LOCATION)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

Encl. (1)

U. S. NAVAL HOSPITAL
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS

NH32-25-jej
6120/1
A61-25
26 May 1961

SECKINGER, Neil V., LCDR/USN, (b) (6) J-101094-DD

GROSS DESCRIPTION

EXTERNAL EXAMINATION: (b) (6)

[redacted]

INTERNAL EXAMINATION: (b) (6) [redacted]

THORACIC CAVITY: (b) (6) [redacted]

ABDOMINAL CAVITY: (b) (6) [redacted]

CRANIAL CAVITY: (b) (6) [redacted]

HEART: (b) (6) [redacted]

AORTA: (b) (6) [redacted]

LUNGS: (b) (6) [redacted]

(b) (6)

GASTROINTESTINAL TRACT:

ESOPHAGUS: (b) (6)

STOMACH: (b) (6)

DUODENUM AND SMALL INTESTINE: (b) (6)

APPENDIX: (b) (6)

COLON: (b) (6)

LIVER: (b) (6)

GALLBLADDER AND BILLARY TRACT: (b) (6)

PANCREAS: (b) (6)

SPLEEN: (b) (6)

ADRENALS: (b) (6)

KIDNEYS: (b) (6)

URETERS: (b) (6)

URINARY BLADDER: (b) (6)

PROSTATE: (b) (6)

NH32-25-jaj
6120/1
..61-25
26 May 1961

TESTES: [redacted]

THYROID: [redacted]

LYMPH NODES: [redacted]

MUSCULOSKELETAL SYSTEM: [redacted]

BRAIN: [redacted]

RADIOGRAPHIC REPORT: SECKINGER, NEIL VINCENT, LCDR USN; (b) (6) [redacted]
AGE 38; SEX MALE; BODY SERIES REQUESTED BY (b) (6) [redacted] 5-25-61; FATALITY
FOLLOWING T2J-1 CRASH (VT-7 NAAS KINGSVILLE, TEXAS)

- -

KINGSVILLE FILMS

BODY SERIES: (b) (6) [redacted]

/s/ RGG
(b) (6) [redacted] LT MC USN

USNH CC TEX

RADIOGRAPHIC REPORT: [redacted] CAPT USMC; HT. [redacted]
AGE 31; SEX MALE; FOLLOWING T2J-1 CRASH (VT-7 NAAS KINGSVILLE, TEXAS)
- -

#2266-61

C-SPINE 5/25/61: [redacted]

[redacted] LT MC USN

USNH CC TEX

Health and Sick Call Records are not considered pertinent to this accident.

Recommendations for Corrective Action

1. It is recommended that closer attention by supervisory authority be exercised both in adherance to Standard Operating procedures and in review of maintenance procedures. A continuous review of procedures by all personnel, flight and maintenance, must be examined periodically in an effort to remain cognizant of changes required or occurrences of non-compliance with standard operating procedures and/or check sheets.

2. It is recommended that both the intermediate and major check sheets on the maintenance of the ejection seats be revised so that the check sheet shows each item to be checked, especially the striker arm pivot pin, which is not listed on the check sheet. It is further recommended that no work be accomplished on the ejection system without a work order being issued.

3. It is recommended that only qualified personnel be permitted to sign off gripes on/or inspection of the ejection seat system. If the number of qualified personnel assigned do not meet the requirements of the command, then a strenuous, conscientious effort must be exerted to train enough other personnel to meet the needs. Special attention must be given to selecting only the most highly qualified personnel to be used as instructors.

4. It is believed that if CAPT (b) (6) had been wearing his oxygen mask at the time of his low level ejection, he would have died from suffocation. This belief is based on the figures of usable time/quantity of the bailout bottle, which is activated at ejection. The emergency oxygen supply is capable of providing approximately 2 to 3 minutes of normal breathing at sea level. From the time of initiation of ejection until help arrived for CAPT (b) (6) 5 to 6 minutes had elapsed and CAPT (b) (6) was unconscious from the time he contacted the ground.

In view of the above it is recommended that the Bureau of Weapons immediately initiate a study of the problem, which is to insure that outside air be made available to the pilot as soon as the emergency oxygen supply has been depleted.

Summary and Conclusions

No sociological, psychological, physiological, or pathological factors are judged to be operative in the genesis of this accident.

The primary contributing cause factor in this accident is the fact that the aircraft did not become airborne due to a suspected failure or malfunction of the elevator control system.

The contributing pilot cause factor in this accident is that a flaps up take-off was attempted, which required almost the full length of the runway for take-off roll and abort stopping distance. This same take-off attempt with flaps down left 1500 feet of runway remaining after take-off roll and abort stopping distance.

This take-off should never have been attempted for the following reasons:

1. Both pilots were Assistant Maintenance Officers and should have realised the significance of taking an aircraft that had discrepancies.

2. The low oil pressure would have been noted prior to commencing take-off roll had the correct procedure of checking engine instruments been used.

3. The speed brakes not extended.

The procedure of going over check-off lists while taxiing on any type of flight is in violation of standard operating procedures of this squadron.

FOR 6-61 TRA[illegible] 7 NAAS KINGSVILLE, TEXAS T2J-1 BUNO 148222. IMPACT DAMAGE TO SAFETY AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT [illegible]: (b) (6) [redacted]

FOR 6-61 [illegible] 7 [illegible] T2J-1 [illegible] 148222. [illegible]

[illegible] (b) (6)

MOR 6-61 TRAINER 7 NAS KINGSVILLE, TEXAS. T2J-1 BUNO 148222. IMPACT DATA E
T. SAFETY AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT. CO-PILOT: SECKINGER, J.V.

MOR 6-61 TRARON 7 NAAS KINGSVILLE, TEXAS. T2J-1 BUNO 148222. IMPACT DAMAGE
TY SAFETY AND SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT. CO-PILOT: SECKINGER, W.V.



EMPLOYING SA TRAROM 7 AAR 6-61 T2J-1 BUNO 146222 PILOT: (b) AIRCRAFT PATH DIAGRAM FROM TAKE OFF SPOT TO PLACE WHERE WRECKAGE CAME TO A STOP. DRAWING IS TO SCALE. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 70 OPNAVINST 3750.6D.

ENCL (5)



ENCLOSURE 52 TRASON 7 AAR 6-61 T33-1 SN'S LL0222 PILOT: [redacted] (b) WRECKAGE DISTRIBUTION DIAGRAM. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 70 OPNAVINST 3750.6B.

ENCLOSURE 6B TRAWON 7 AAR 6-61 [illegible]-1 BUNO 148222. PILOT: (b)(6) VIEW OF WRECKAGE WHILE STANDING IN BOTTOM OF STREAM LOOKING TOWARD THE RUNWAY. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE STREAM BED IS ABOUT 35 FEET BELOW RUNWAY LEVEL. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 70 OPNAVINST 3750.6D.

ENCLOSURE 62 TRARON 7 AAR 6-61 T2J-1 BUNO 154222. PILOT: (b) (6) CLOSE-UP VIEW OF MAIN WRECKAGE SHOWING EXTENT OF BURN DAMAGE. THE RIGHT WING, COCKPIT AREA AND TOP OF FUSELAGE WERE COMPLETELY CONSUMED BY THE ENSUING FIRE. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH [illegible] TO OPNAVINST 3750.6D.

ENCLOSURE 6J TRARON 7 AAR 6-61 T2J-1 BUNO 148222 PILOT: (b)(6) VIEW OF BOTTOM OF CANOPY ACTUATOR SHOWING THE THREADS OF GAS TUBE FITTING ON ACTUATOR IN GOOD CONDITION. THIS INDICATES GAS TUBE WAS NOT CONNECTED TO THE FITTING WHEN ACCIDENT OCCURRED. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 70 OPNAVINST 3750.6D.



ENCLOSURE 6A [illegible] 6-61 T2J-1 BUNO 148222. PILOT: [redacted] VIEW OF TERRAIN AT UP WIND END OF RUNWAY 17. (A) BURNED SPOT. (B)MAIN WRECKAGE. (C) CAPT. SMITH'S SEAT. (D) CAPT [redacted] POSITION. PART OF PARACHUTE VISIBLE THROUGH THE TREES. (E) LCDR. SECKINGER AND SEAT. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 70, OPNAVINST 3750.6D .

ENCLOSURE 6D TPARON 7 AAR 6-61 T2J-1 BUNO 148222 PILOT: (b) (6) WHERE CAPT. (b) (6) SEAT CAME TO REST. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 7) OPNAVINST 3750.6D.

ENCLOSURE 6E TRARON 7 AAR 6-61 T2J-1 BUNO 148222. PILOT: (b) (6) . WHERE CAPT. (b) (6) PARACHUTE CANOPY LANDED. CAPT. (b) (6) WAS ON OTHER SIDE OF FENCE HAVING GONE THROUGH THE AREA INDICATED BY THE CIRCLE. CAPT. (b) (6) HIT THE TOP OF THE FENCE IN LOWER PART OF THE CIRCLE. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 70, OPNAVINST 3750.6D.



ENCLOSURE 6F TRARON 7 AAR 6-61 T2J-1 BUNO 148222. PILOT: (b)(6). ARROW POINTS TO AREA WHERE LCDR. SECKINGER AND HIS SEAT CONTACTED THE GROUND. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 70 OPNAVINST 3750.6D.

ENCLOSURE 6G TRARON 7 AAR 6-61 T2J-1 BUNO 148222. PILOT: (b) (6) . WHERE LCDR. SECKINGER AND SEAT CAME TO REST. THIS WAS 25 FEET FROM WHERE CONTACT WITH THE GROUND WAS MADE. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 70 OPNAVINST 3750.6D.



ENCLOSURE 61 THARON 7 AAR 6-61 T2J-1 B/N 150222 PILOT: (b)(6) [illegible]
SHOWING THAT [illegible] ARM PIVOT CLEVIS PIN [illegible]
TO BE IN THE POSITION AS INDICATED BY ENCLOSURE 61. (A) BOLT AND (B)
WHERE PIN SHOULD BE. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA-
GRAPH 70 OPNAVINST.3750.6D.



ENCLOSURE 6H TRARON 7 AAR 6-61 T2J-1 BUNO 148222 PILOT: (b) (6) VIEW OF LEFT SIDE OF LCDR. SECKINGER'S SEAT. THIS PHOTOGRAPH WAS TAKEN AT THE SCENE BEFORE PILOT OR SEAT WERE MOVED. ARROW INDICATES POSITION OF EJECTION SEAT STRIKER MECHANISM BELLCRANK. FOLLOWING PHOTOGRAPH (ENC.6I) SHOWS COMPLETE BELLCRANK. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 70 OPNAVINST 3750.6D.